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his thesis is the result of four years of research that has been carried out as 
part of CATO, the Dutch national research program on carbon dioxide 
(CO2) capture and storage (CCS) technologies. A range of organizations 
participate in this program, including environmental NGOs, organizations from the 
oil and gas industry, electricity companies, governme t bodies, and scientific 
institutions. These organizations, which I will refer to as “CCS stakeholders”, 
consider large scale implementation of CCS a key strategy to mitigate climate 
change. In addition to research on the technological issues surrounding CCS, it is 
recognized within the CATO program that research on public perceptions and 
acceptance of this technology is of crucial importance. That is, public acceptance is 
imperative in order to avoid the situation that millions of euros are invested in 
development of a technology that, in the end, cannot be employed because of 
public opposition to implementation of the technology in society. The social 
psychological research within the CATO program therefore examines factors that 
are relevant to establish and predict future public ac eptance of CCS. 
This thesis focuses on the role of public trust in CCS stakeholders with 
regard to public acceptance of CCS. It consists of four chapters.1 Chapter 1 paints a 
picture of climate change and the importance of CCS in mitigating it, followed by a 
discussion of the origins of public trust as well as potential ways to instigate trust 
in the general public. Additionally, this chapter provides an overview of the main 
research results and an integrative discussion of the value and implications of the 
research. The remaining three chapters (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) contain more detailed 
reports of the empirical work carried out on the origins of public trust and the 
relationship between public trust in CCS stakeholders and public acceptance of 
CCS. More specifically, Chapter 2 focuses on how indicators of organizational 
integrity and organizational competence affect people’s sense of trust in 
organizations as well as on how people’s trust affects their tendencies to go along 
with or oppose organizational positions regarding CCS. Chapter 3 focuses on 
organizational motives and organizational communications in order to develop an 
                                                
1 Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are based on papers that have either been published or that have been 
submitted for publication. As a consequence thereof, these chapters can be read 
independently from each other and some overlap exists between the introductory sections 
of these chapters.  
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understanding of why some CCS stakeholders are trusted more than others and 
how these organizations can instigate trust through communication. Chapter 4 
addresses the issue of how characteristics of the political decision-making process 
regarding implementation of CCS affect people’s trut in CCS decision makers and 







Decision making about carbon dioxide capture  
and storage: The role of trust in stakeholders 
 
limate change is among the most important issues on the current political 
and scientific agenda. Scientists and other experts in the field almost 
unanimously recognize that climate change is caused by ever-increasing 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.2 In its 2007 report, the 
intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC) concludes that “most of the 
observed increase in the globally averaged temperatur  since the mid-20th century 
is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations” and that there is sufficient evidence “to conclude with high 
confidence that anthropogenic warming over the past three decades has had a 
discernable influence on many physical and biological systems” (IPCC, 2007, p. 
9). In this report, the IPCC also discusses the far-re ching (and primarily negative) 
consequences of climate change, including consequences for ecosystems (e.g., 
extinction of plant and animal species), industry and society (e.g., economic and 
social costs of more intense and/or more frequent extreme weather events), and 
human health (e.g., increased casualties due to hea waves, floods, etcetera). While 
there are some benefits associated with climate change s well (e.g., fewer deaths 
from cold exposure, reduced demand for heating), the net effect will be decidedly 
negative (IPCC, 2007). Therefore, political and scientific attention is increasingly 
being directed to develop climate change mitigation strategies. 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas, which is increasingly 
being released into the atmosphere due to the extensive use of fossil fuels in energy 
generation. Industrialized countries, the main contribu ors to increased carbon 
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere, need to lower their emissions of carbon 
                                                
2 Media coverage tends to contrast a single representative of those who are convinced that 
climate change is caused by increased carbon dioxide emissions (the overwhelming 
majority of experts) to a single representative of those who do not believe in this causal 
relationship (a small minority of experts). As a result, a considerable number of people are 






dioxide to be able to mitigate climate change effectiv ly. For this reason, the 
European Commission has formulated the aim to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
in industrialized countries by 20% in 2020 compared to 1990. The Dutch 
government has committed to an even more stringent target of reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions in the Netherlands by 30% in 2020 compared to 1990. 
Policymakers are in search of strategies to reach these goals. 
One of the most obvious strategies to decrease carbon dioxide emissions is 
to save on energy consumption. The problem with this strategy is that it requires a 
behavioral change that is not easily realized (De Young, 1993), not in the least 
because people attach great value to their current level of prosperity and are 
reluctant to take a step back. Moreover, because newly industrialized countries 
(e.g., India, China) aim to achieve higher standards of living, global energy use and 
concomitant carbon dioxide emissions will increase rather than decrease. A second 
strategy is to increase the use of sustainable energy sources (e.g., solar and wind 
energy). This option in isolation, however, will not generate enough energy to meet 
the existing energy demand. Because in the short run measures taken to stimulate 
use of sustainable energy sources and saving on energy consumption will be 
insufficient to prevent climate change from happening, more immediate measures 
need to be taken in addition to these more long-term climate change mitigation 
strategies. 
 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage 
Implementation of recently developed carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) 
technology is currently considered a relevant climate change mitigation strategy. 
This technology involves the capture of carbon dioxi e (either pre or post 
combustion) in power plants or other major industrial organizations, the transport 
of the carbon dioxide to underground sites (e.g., depleted gas fields), and the 
subsequent injection and storage of the carbon dioxide in these sites. Once 
implemented, CCS will make a significant contribution to the decrease of carbon 
dioxide emissions. For that reason, policymakers regard CCS as the third central 
climate change mitigation strategy. Environmental NGOs also recognize the carbon 
dioxide reducing potential of CCS but some are, for a variety of reasons, somewhat 
more ambiguous (e.g., some have the concern that CCS may go at the expense of 
money and effort invested in development of more long-term and sustainable 
solutions). 
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Public acceptance of CCS will be crucial for the realization of this 
technology as a strategy to mitigate climate change. Th  need for public acceptance 
of policy initiatives such as CCS is illustrated, among other examples, by the 1995 
Brent Spar case. In this instance, industrial organization Shell preferred the deep-
sea disposal over the onshore disposal of Brent Spar, its decommissioned oil 
storage and loading structure. Shell had assessed the environmental risks of deep-
sea disposal and concluded that these were negligible. Nevertheless, environmental 
NGO Greenpeace portrayed the deep-sea disposal option as highly risky, which 
instigated considerable public opposition to Shell’s position on the issue. 
Ultimately, this lack of public acceptance and the political commotion it elicited 
forced Shell to develop an alternative to the deep-sea disposal of Brent Spar (for a 
more detailed description of the Brent Spar case, se  Löfstedt and Renn, 1997). In 
a similar vein, the lurking danger concerning CCS is that members of the general 
public can mobilize political resistance against CCS implementation, which would 
severely reduce the viability of this technology. Accordingly, it is highly relevant 
to further examine how people decide to accept or oppose CCS. 
 
The importance of public trust 
The central proposition in this thesis is that public acceptance of CCS will depend 
on people’s trust in CCS stakeholders rather than on specific qualities of the 
technology. Underlying this idea is the fact that members of the general public are 
not able to accurately judge CCS on its merits. After all, it is beyond doubt that a 
high level of expert knowledge and scientific training as well as a huge cognitive 
effort is required to be able to adequately judge such a complex technology. At the 
same time, most people simply are unable to access or judge relevant information 
(or do not have the opportunity or motivation to do so). In situations such as these, 
people’s positions on the subject often do not result from in-depth analysis of the 
issue at hand, but more likely result from rules of thumb, so-called heuristics (see 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). In line with the position taken by Earle and 
Cvetkovich (1995) that trust can be thought of as “ tool for the reduction of 
cognitive complexity” (p.33), I propose that people will rely on their sense of trust 
in CCS stakeholders when they decide whether to accept or oppose CCS 
implementation. Thus, instead of considering the eff cts of specific qualities of 
CCS technology on public acceptance of this technology, this thesis focuses on 
how the (perceived) qualities of CCS stakeholders affect people’s trust in these 




There already is some empirical support for the general importance of 
public trust with regard to public acceptance of modern technologies. For example, 
Siegrist’s (2000) research on public acceptance of gene technology suggests that 
trust in organizations that are responsible for the management and use of this 
technology serves as a guide in lay attitude formation. He hypothesized and found 
that people associated greater benefits and smaller risks with gene technology to 
the extent that they trusted the organizations involved. As a consequence, people 
were more accepting of this technology when trust was high rather than low. These 
results are consistent with the idea that people’s s nse of trust in organizations can 
function as a “guiding principle” in their decisions to accept or oppose complex 
technologies. Nevertheless, due to the correlational nature of Siegrist’s research, 
the assumed causal direction of the psychological process (i.e., trust affects 
perceived risks and benefits, which in turn affect public acceptance) is subject of 
debate (see e.g., Eiser, Miles, & Frewer, 2002; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2005). In 
addition, there are no conclusive empirical data indicating how organizations can 
instigate trust in the general public.  
 
Origins of public trust  
The identification of key factors that may build or destroy trust in CCS 
stakeholders requires some understanding of the concept of trust. Nowadays, the 
(cross-disciplinary) definition of trust provided by Rousseau and colleagues 
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998) is widely used. These authors 
conceptualize trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of 
another” (p. 395). At the core of this definition are the terms “vulnerability”, which 
refers to a degree of dependency, and “expectations”, which implies some degree 
of uncertainty about another’s intentions and future actions. These core elements, 
Rousseau and colleagues (1998) note, are recognized in many alternative 
definitions of trust and apply regardless of the type of party that is (not) trusted – 
another person or an organization. At the same time, despite extensive theorizing 
on the subject, trust has remained a rather fuzzy concept in the literature. For 
example, notwithstanding apparent consistencies across definitions, a fair amount 
of disagreement remains about whether trust is a unidimensional or 
multidimensional concept and, if multidimensional, what constitute these different 
dimensions. 
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Narrowing the scope from the broadest level of analysis to the specific 
concept of public trust in organizations (the central topic of the current thesis) does 
not provide an instant solution for this conceptual problem. That is, several 
scholars have argued that public trust in organizations should be thought of as a 
multidimensional concept, but some argue that it consists of five distinct 
dimensions (e.g., Renn & Levine, 1991), while others argue for four (e.g., 
Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 1992), three (e.g., Peters, Covello, & McCallum, 
1997), or two (e.g., Jungermann, Pfister, & Fischer, 1996; Metlay, 1999). 
Illustrative in this regard is the paper by Metlay (1999) with the telling title 
“Institutional trust and confidence: A journey into a conceptual quagmire”.3 
Herein, Metlay reviews some literature on the basis of which he identifies seven 
possibly distinct dimensions of trust. These included openness, consistency, 
honesty, credibility, fairness, concern, and competence. Nevertheless, Metlay’s test 
to verify whether these dimensions could indeed be distinguished empirically 
indicated a two-factor solution rather similar to results obtained by Jungermann 
and colleagues (1996). The first factor represented what Jungermann and 
colleagues call the “honesty” dimension of trust and what Metlay refers to as the 
“affective” component of trust (which included all items except those that assessed 
organizational competence). The second factor repres nt d the “competence” 
component of trust (which only consisted of items assessing organizational 
expertise). Based on this research, Metlay’s conclusion is that trust is not very 
complex, but refers to a rather straightforward two-dimensional concept. In this 
thesis, I will focus on these two primary dimension of trust. 
My aim is to identify how CCS stakeholders can instigate trust in the 
general public and to show how trust affects public ac eptance of CCS rather than 
to solve issues surrounding proper definition or measurement of the trust concept. 
The literature reviewed above suggests that interventions aimed at building trust 
can only be successful to the extent that they elevate perceptions of organizational 
integrity (i.e., the affective or honesty dimension f trust) and/or organizational 
competence. After all, most scholars recognize thate origins of public trust 
                                                
3 Metlay (1999) did not distinguish between trust and confidence, but some authors argue 
that conceptual differences exist (Earle & Siegrist, 2006; Siegrist, Earle, & Gutscher, 2003). 
According to Siegrist and colleagues (2003), the difference is that trust involves risk and 
vulnerability (cf. Rousseau et al., 1998), while confidence does not. Moreover, these 
authors note that the objects of trust are person-like entities (including organizations), while 





consist of indicators of organizational integrity and organizational competence 
(regardless of whether these indicators are considered separate dimensions or part 
of one of these two overarching categories). Given the objective to understand 
people’s current trust in CCS stakeholders and to develop strategies to raise it, I 
will address people’s perceptions of stakeholder integrity and competence as bases 
for public trust in CCS stakeholders, which in turn may be used to predict and 
explain public acceptance of CCS.  
 
Instigating trust through communication 
Beliefs regarding the intentions of an organization constitute an important 
determinant of public trust (cf. Rousseau et al., 1998). Therefore, assessing 
people’s expectations about the reasons for organizations to be involved in CCS is 
relevant to understand current levels of public trust in these organizations. For 
instance, CCS stakeholders may be seen by the general public as being motivated 
by a prospect of economic gain, or as being motivated by a prospect of a cleaner 
natural environment. I will refer to reasons such as these that are seen to underlie 
organizational policy and actions as organizational motives. I argue that people’s 
inferences about organizational motives are likely to affect the level of public trust 
in CCS stakeholders.  
Two principal types of motives can be distinguished: Motives reflecting 
concern for public interests and motives reflecting concern for organizational 
interests. In the literature, various labels have be n used to refer to these two types 
of motives, including altruistic versus egoistic motives (e.g., Batson, 1994, 1996), 
other-centered versus self-centered motives (e.g., Ellen, Mohr, & Webb, 2000), 
societal interest versus self-interest (e.g., Funk, 2000), and external goals versus 
internal goals (e.g., Nilsson, Von Borgstede, & Biel, 2004). In this thesis, these two 
classes of motives are referred to as public-serving motives and organization-
serving motives because this terminology best matches the organizational level of 
this thesis. Public-serving motives reflect organiztional concern for public welfare 
and benefits of people outside the organization (i.e., members of the general 
public), while organization-serving motives refer to a focus of the organization on 
economic gain and maximization of benefits for the organization itself (cf. 
Forehand & Grier, 2003). I propose that an important f ctor that affects people’s 
trust in CCS stakeholders is the extent to which these organizations are perceived 
to be concerned with public interests. 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage: The role of trus  
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If environmental NGOs are trusted more than industrial organizations due 
to the public-serving motives that they are believed to act upon, then industrial 
organizations may raise trust by expressing such public-serving motives. In that 
sense, industrial stakeholders may benefit from communicating the positive impact 
that CCS will have on preservation of the natural environment. After all, members 
of the general public are likely to positively value the content of the motive 
communicated, not in the least because preservation of the natural environment 
serves public interests rather than that it directly serves the industrial stakeholders’ 
interests. Hence, at first glance, expressing public-serving motives may be a 
relevant strategy to instigate trust in the general public for CCS stakeholders that 
are seen to act upon organization-serving motives.  
On the other hand, an industrial stakeholder that communicates concern for 
the natural environmental runs the risk of being perceived as failing to 
acknowledge its “true” organizational motives and hence of being deemed 
dishonest. Previous research on corporate societal marketing (CSM) and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activities indeed suggests that while people generally 
appreciate companies that are sensitive to the societal effects of their activities, 
simply claiming concern with public interests may harm company evaluations 
(Ellen, Webb, & Mohr, 2006; Forehand & Grier, 2003; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, & 
Schwarz, 2006). That is, people may be doubtful as to whether the concern that is 
expressed by the organization reflects its true organizational motives or whether it 
is invoked to mask ulterior organization-serving motives. In case of the latter, the 
content of the motive communicated is valued positively, but at the same time it 
will be seen as incongruent with the organizational motive, causing the 
organization to be perceived dishonest and untrustworthy. By contrast, to the extent 
that perceived organizational honesty affects people’s trust in organizations, an 
alternative strategy for industrial stakeholders to consider is to disclose their 
concern for the organization-serving qualities of CCS. While its content is not very 
much valued, an organization-serving motive that is communicated (e.g., economic 
gain) is likely to be seen as congruent with the organizational motive, indicating 
honesty. 
In sum, expressing concern for public interests mayinstigate trust in CCS 
stakeholders to the extent that public-serving motives are valued over organization-
serving motives. This strategy may backfire, however, when communications are 
seen as an attempt to mask ulterior organization-serving motives. In that case, 




of organizational integrity and public trust. Thus, there may be a tradeoff between 
value and congruency that is relevant with regard to the instigation public trust. 
This thesis aims to show that it is the degree of congruency between inferred 
organizational motives and organizational communications rather than the sole 
content of organizational communications that determines public trust in 
organizations. I will address these communication issues in Chapter 3.  
 
Political decision making and the instigation of trust 
In addition to public perceptions of individual stakeholders, people’s perceptions of 
the decision-making process are also relevant for the creation of public trust and 
acceptance of policy decisions concerning CCS. I propose that people who learn 
that the decision-making process has been proper and fair should be more inclined 
to trust the decision maker and, as a result, should be more likely to accept the 
decisions made. For this reason, communicating how decisions regarding CCS are 
reached may constitute an important tool for political decision makers to instigate 
trust in the general public. But what are important characteristics of proper decision 
making and do these actually help to raise public trust?  
It is a well-established phenomenon that people often base their 
evaluations of decisions on whether or not they have received an opportunity to 
express their opinions in decision-making processes rather than on the specific 
outcomes or nature of the decisions made. This chara teristic of decision-making 
processes is often referred to as “voice” (Folger, 1977). Why people care about 
personal voice in decision making is often explained by referring to instrumental 
and relational concerns (Tyler & Lind, 1992). From an instrumental perspective, an 
individual cares about opportunities to voice his or her opinion in decision-making 
processes because expressing one’s view on an issue may persuade the decision 
maker to provide this person with more favorable outc mes. At the relational level, 
an individual values voice in decision making because being denied or provided 
with voice conveys self-relevant information concerning the extent to which the 
decision-making authority values and respects the individual in question. As such, 
both these perspectives on voice in decision making consider personal voice 
important because of the self-oriented implications f particular treatment.  
It is important to note that in most previous research on voice individuals 
whose personal outcomes were at stake were personally involved in the decision-
making process. Less attention has been paid to whether voice can also be 
considered an important characteristic of decision making when people are not 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage: The role of trus  
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directly personally involved in the decision-making process, which is more likely 
to be the case in public decision making. In cases such as these, the effects of 
allowing for voice cannot as easily be explained by the traditional self-oriented 
explanations mentioned above, given that in this cae personal implications of 
voice procedures are not as straightforward as theyar  with personal voice (cf. 
Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998). Nevertheless, I argue that people also consider 
voice an important characteristic of decision-making procedures when they are not 
directly personally involved in the decision-making process. That is, the provision 
of voice to parties involved in public decision making may indicate fair decision 
making and signals that the decision maker can be trusted for its integrity and 
openness to inputs from different parties. Accordingly, in this thesis I aim to show 
that political decision makers are likely to instigate trust and facilitate public 
acceptance of the decisions they make when they provide interest groups with an 
opportunity to voice opinions in CCS decision making (i.e., group voice). I will 
address this decision-making issue in Chapter 4. The next section summarizes the 
results of the empirical research per chapter. 
 
Overview of empirical findings 
 
Effects of integrity-based and competence-based trust 
In Chapter 2, a distinction is made between trust based on indicators of 
organizational integrity and trust based on indicators of competence in order to 
examine how these two types of trust affect public a ceptance of CCS 
implementation. Siegrist’s (2000) research served as the starting point for these 
studies. Siegrist proposed a model in which lay judgments concerning risks and 
benefits associated with modern technologies mediat the influence of trust in 
organizations on public acceptance of such technologies. Eiser and colleagues 
(Eiser et al, 2002) have referred to this model as the causal chain account of trust. 
The causal chain account has neither been subjected to xperimental testing, nor 
has previous research examined its validity for competence-based trust and 
integrity-based trust separately. Chapter 2 reports on two experimental studies that 
were designed to test the causal chain account for both competence-based trust and 
integrity-based trust. 
The argument for the relevancy of distinguishing between competence-
based trust and integrity-based trust stems from findings in person-perception 




information about competence more heavily than negative information about 
competence, but tend to weigh negative information about integrity more heavily 
than positive information about integrity (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). Based on 
this asymmetry principle, I predicted positive rather than negative information 
about the competence of an organization to affect public acceptance of CCS. By 
contrast, I expected negative rather than positive nformation about integrity to 
affect public acceptance of CCS. I further tested whether perceptions of risks and 
benefits associated with CCS mediated these effects. 
Study 2.1 focused on organizational competence and followed a 2 
(competence-based trust: high vs. low) by 2 (organizational position regarding 
CCS: pro vs. con) between-subjects factorial design. The first hypothesis was that 
organizational position would affect acceptance of CCS when competence-based 
trust was high, but not when competence-based trust was low. The second 
hypothesis was that perceptions of the risks and benefits associated with CCS 
would mediate the effect of competence-based trust and organizational position on 
acceptance of CCS (i.e., the causal chain model). Rsults indicated that people 
were indeed more positive about CCS when the organization was portrayed as a 
proponent compared to an opponent of CCS, but only i  the case of high 
competence-based trust (organizational position did not affect acceptance of CCS 
in the case of low competence-based trust). Moreover, results showed that people’s 
perceptions of the benefits associated with CCS (but not their perceptions of risks) 
mediated this effect. Thus, this study largely confirmed the hypotheses and 
indicates support for the causal chain account. 
Study 2.2 focused on organizational integrity and followed a 2 (integrity-
based trust: high vs. low) by 2 (organizational positi n regarding CCS: pro vs. con) 
between-subjects factorial design. The first hypothesis was that organizational 
position would influence acceptance of CCS only in the case of low integrity-based 
trust. Consistent with the causal chain model, the second hypothesis was that 
perceptions of risks and benefits would mediate the eff ct of integrity-based trust 
and organizational position on people’s willingness to accept CCS. This time, 
results revealed that, in the case of low integrity-based trust, people were more 
negative about CCS when the organization was portrayed as a proponent compared 
to an opponent of CCS, while in the case of high integrity-based trust no reliable 
effects of organizational position were observed. Results did not provide support 
for the causal chain account because neither perceiv d benefits nor perceived risks 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage: The role of trus  
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mediated the effect of integrity-based trust and organizational position on people’s 
acceptance of CCS.  
 
Organizational motives and communications 
Chapter 3 focuses on public trust in CCS stakeholders as a function of inferred 
organizational motives and organizational communications. It provides insight into 
how inferred organizational motives affect trust and further suggests that 
organizational communications should at least in part match inferred motives to 
instigate trust. Study 3.1 was an internet survey among members of the general 
public designed to examine whether public trust in CCS stakeholders depends on 
people’s inferences of organizational motives. The survey consisted of questions to 
assess public trust in CCS stakeholders as well as people’s inferences of 
organizational motives. Respondents first indicated their familiarity with each of 
the CCS stakeholders. Subsequently, they completed a v rsion of the questionnaire 
that asked them about their perceptions of one of these organizations (either one of 
three industrial stakeholders or one of three enviro mental NGOs). The hypothesis 
was that public trust in NGOs would be higher than trust in industrial organizations 
due to differential inferred motives of these organiz tions (i.e., public-serving 
motives in the case of NGOs and organization-serving in the case of industrial 
organizations). As expected, results of this study revealed that people thought 
environmental NGOs to be involved in CCS out of public-serving motives (e.g., 
public health, concern for the natural environment), whereas they thought that 
industrial organizations were involved in CCS out of organization-serving motives 
(e.g., economic gain, image). In turn, these different motives accounted for the 
higher level of public trust in environmental NGOs than in industrial organizations. 
Important to note is that perceived level of organiz tional competence did not 
differ between the types of organizations and thus cannot account for differences in 
trust. 
Study 3.2 tested the hypothesis that it is the congruency between 
organizational communications and inferred organization l motives rather than the 
objective content of organizational communications that leads to public trust in 
organizations. It followed a 2 (type of organization: environmental NGOs vs. 
industrial organizations) by 2 (communicated argument: nvironmental argument 
vs. economic argument) between-subjects factorial design. In line with hypotheses, 
results showed that congruence between inferred motive and communicated motive 




more trust in organizations than incongruence (e.g., an industrial organization 
communicating an environmental argument) and that tis effect was mediated by 
perceived organizational honesty.  
Study 3.3 was designed to replicate the abovementioned congruency effect 
and to examine how trust would be affected by communications consisting of both 
a congruent and an incongruent argument. The design of this study was a 1 (type of 
organization: industrial organization) by 3 (communicated arguments: two 
environmental arguments vs. two economic arguments vs. an environmental 
argument and an economic argument) between-subjects factorial. Results 
replicated those of Study 3.2 in that congruence instigated more trust than 
incongruence, but also showed that communicating an argument incongruent with 
the inferred organizational motive (i.e., an environmental argument) does not 
necessarily undermine trust as long as an argument that is congruent with the 
inferred motive (i.e., an economic argument) is communicated simultaneously. 
Again, perceived organizational honesty mediated this effect. 
 
Group voice and acceptance of political decisions 
In Chapter 4, I focus on how the involvement of CCS stakeholders in decision 
making about CCS influences people’s trust in the decision maker and acceptance 
of decisions made. Study 4.1 followed a 2 (procedur: g oup voice vs. no voice) by 
2 (advice regarding CCS implementation: pro vs. con) between-subjects factorial 
design to test the hypothesis that a group-voice procedure would lead to higher 
levels of trust in the decision maker and greater acceptance of the decision made 
than a no-voice procedure. In the group-voice conditions, both environmental 
NGOs and industrial organizations had an opportunity to express their opinions 
about CCS to the decision maker (i.e., a political board that had been assigned the 
task to formulate an advice concerning CCS), while th se organizations did not 
have such an opportunity in the no-voice conditions. Results supported the 
predictions in that participants in the group-voice conditions indicated to have 
more trust in the decision maker and, as a consequence, accepted the outcome to a 
greater extent than those in the no-voice condition, regardless of whether it was for 
or against CCS implementation. 
Study 4.2 aimed to extend results of Study 4.1 by investigating whether the 
effects of the decision-making procedure on inferred trustworthiness and 
acceptance of the decision made were due to procedural features (i.e., the presence 
or absence of group voice) or due to the involvement of specific parties in the 
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decision-making process. The study followed a 3 (procedure: voice for NGOs only 
vs. voice for industrial organizations only vs. voice for both NGOs and industrial 
organizations) by 2 (advice regarding CCS implementation: pro vs. con) between-
subjects factorial design. As expected, results replicated those of Study 4.1 in that 
inferred trustworthiness mediated the effect of decision-making procedure on 
acceptance of the advice. In addition, results showed that equal-voice procedures 
instigated more trust than unequal-voice procedures, r gardless of the type of 
organizations that had received an opportunity to voice their opinions. 
Study 4.3 focused on the influence of participants’ knowledge level 
concerning CCS on their preference to include members of the general public in 
CCS decision making (i.e., public voice). The study followed a 2 (information 
about CCS: yes vs. no) by 2 (procedure: public voice vs. public no voice) between-
subjects factorial design. Providing half of the participants with information about 
CCS created a relatively knowledgeable group of participants and a relatively 
unknowledgeable group of participants. The hypothesis was that people who had 
some knowledge about CCS would respond differently to public-voice procedures 
than people who had no knowledge about CCS. That is, knowledgeable people 
were expected to report higher trust in the decision maker and greater acceptance 
of decisions in the case of public-voice procedures than in the case of public-no-
voice procedures, while no such differences were expected among 
unknowledgeable people. Results indicated support for this prediction. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
As mentioned before, capture and storage of carbon dioxide (CCS) is considered an 
important strategy to mitigate climate change, but p blic acceptance of this 
technology will be critical for successful implementation of CCS in society. In this 
thesis, I argue that people’s trust in CCS stakeholders (e.g., environmental NGOs, 
industrial organizations, governmental organizations) is a significant determinant 
of whether people accept or oppose CCS implementatio . I further argue that 
people’s perceptions of organizational integrity and organizational competence are 
central to understand trust in CCS stakeholders. By addressing processes that build 
or destroy trust in CCS stakeholders, this thesis has both important theoretical and 
practical value. 
This thesis yields an interesting contribution to existing literature on the 




integrity-based trust on acceptance of CCS are diffrent. Whereas previous tests of 
the causal chain model (e.g., Siegrist, 2000; Tanak, 2004) did not explicitly 
distinguish between competence-based trust and integr ty-based trust, the research 
reported in Chapter 2 shows that it is important to make this distinction. This 
research sheds new light on the validity of the causal chain account of trust because 
it suggests that the causal model holds true for competence-based trust, but not for 
integrity-based trust. Furthermore, research in this c apter indicates that perceived 
lack of organizational integrity is detrimental for people’s trust in CCS 
stakeholders and their subsequent willingness to cooperate with these organizations 
(i.e., go along with the organizational position). An organization that is seen to lack 
integrity instigates distrust rather than trust in he general public, which as a result 
causes people to oppose rather than to go along with the position advocated by the 
organization in question. Accordingly, for those who consider CCS implementation 
a good climate change mitigation strategy it is imperative to avoid being perceived 
as lacking integrity to be able to build trust and facilitate acceptance of CCS. 
 
Indicators of organizational integrity 
One element of organizational integrity is the extent to which organizations are 
perceived to be concerned with public interests instead of organizational interests. 
In this regard, it seems that perceived lack of integri y is less of a problem for 
environmental NGOs than it is for industrial organizat ons. Indeed, Chapter 3 
indicates that inferred organizational motives constitute the basis for differential 
levels of public trust in environmental NGOs and industrial organizations. 
Industrial stakeholders are trusted less because they are expected to be involved in 
CCS out of organization-serving motives such as economic opportunities rather 
than out of public-serving motives such as concern fo  preservation of the natural 
environment. Thus, industrial organizations must act in ways that signal higher 
levels of organizational integrity than the currently perceived levels of integrity. 
An obvious strategy that industrial stakeholders may utilize to elevate 
public perceptions of organizational integrity is to communicate the environmental 
benefits of CCS, thereby expressing their concern fo  public interests. If it were 
effective, this strategy would seem to attack peopl’s negative thoughts concerning 
the organization-serving motives underlying actions of industrial organizations 
most directly. Research discussed in Chapter 3 reveals, however, that there are 
important drawbacks to this type of strategy. That is, people seem to expect ulterior 
organization-serving motives, causing industrial stakeholders to be seen as 
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dishonest. In the case that people suspect such a hidden agenda, this type of 
strategy, aimed to raise existing perceptions of organizational integrity, is likely to 
backfire in that it seems to reduce rather than increase perceived organizational 
integrity and public trust. This chapter further shows that a better strategy to 
instigate trust is to acknowledge the organization-serving benefits of CCS 
technology in addition to emphasizing its public-serving benefits. If industrial 
stakeholders are open in communicating that CCS also ha  qualities that may serve 
organizational interests, then this type of strategy si nals that the organization is 
acting honestly. Perceived openness and honesty indicate organizational integrity 
and instigate trust. It therefore seems that organizations benefit most from 
communicating those qualities of CCS that are congruent with inferred 
organizational motives. 
In a similar vein, distrust in government bodies is often associated with 
public suspicion of “backroom politics”, indicating that people perceive a lack of 
openness in political decision-making processes. One way to tackle this problem is 
to write out referenda, so that all members of the general public have personal 
voice and are personally in charge of policy decision . Such a strategy will reduce 
feelings of backroom politics and hence may instigate trust, but the difficulty is that 
members of the general public have little personal knowledge about chemical 
constructs such as carbon dioxide, let alone about h w to judge CCS on its merits. 
Moreover, compared to members of the general public, it may be that people living 
nearby actual storage sites are more negative about CCS to the extent that they 
worry about personal risks and safety that are probably less relevant considerations 
for most other people. Therefore, a national referendum does not seem to be the 
most appropriate tool with regard to the issue of CCS, although this is not to say 
that policy makers can disregard public concerns about CCS.  
This thesis suggests an alternative and rather simple strategy that may 
avoid public suspicion of backroom politics: Communicating how decisions about 
CCS will be or even have been reached. While relevant considerations that lead to 
particular decision preferences are often communicated (CCS should be 
implemented because…), the process that is used to arrive at such decisions is 
often not communicated explicitly. This is important to recognize because 
providing a rationale for decisions can only be done after decisions have been 
made, while communicating how decisions concerning CCS will be (or even have 
been) reached can already start in the early stages of CCS decision making, thereby 




Imperative in this regard is to stress that multiple arties with different identities 
and interests are involved in CCS decision making ad that each of these 
organizations is heard before policy decisions willbe made. Communicating that 
parties that are trusted by members of the general pub ic (e.g., environmental 
NGOs) are involved in decision making about CCS is not sufficient to instigate 
trust, because decision-making procedures are only considered proper and fair to 
the extent that all parties involved receive an opportunity to voice their opinions 
about CCS. Fairness in and openness about decision making indicates integrity, 
instigating trust in the general public and creating greater willingness to accept the 
decisions made.  
 
Informing the public about CCS 
It is important to recognize the process through which provision of information 
about CCS influences public trust and acceptance of CCS with an eye to identify 
how people can best be informed on this issue. At this point in time, members of 
the general public have little knowledge about CCS. Therefore, it is relevant to 
think about how people can best be informed about CCS. In such matters, a great 
deal of attention is often paid to the content of the information to be provided (e.g., 
difficulty, scope, completeness), but only little to factors that influence how people 
perceive information (e.g., the source) or how respon es to information may be 
different for informed compared to uninformed people. Some people may find it 
sufficient to know how parties that they trust think about CCS or that the decision-
making process is accurate. Others may be more inclined to look for information to 
judge CCS on its merits on their own. But also in the latter case, source 
characteristics such as organizational integrity and organizational competence will 
affect how people perceive the information; information is not only judged on its 
objective content, but also on the source providing the information. For example, 
the same information is evaluated differently depending on whether or not the 
source is considered competent, which in turn affects whether people think CCS 
should be implemented (see Chapter 2). Similarly, when information about the 
environmental benefits of CCS is provided by an industrial stakeholder, this 
information instigates less trust than when the same information is provided by an 
environmental NGO (see chapter 3). Based on the resea ch in this thesis [and on 
related research by Ter Mors (2008), and de Best-Waldhober and colleagues (de 
Best-Waldhober, Daamen, & Faaij, in press)] I would conclude that providing 
factual information about CCS is one aspect of informing the public, but one 
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should also be aware that public acceptance of CCS does not solely depend on the 
quality of the information provided, but on the source providing the information 
and the process of decision making as well. 
 
Experimental simulations in an applied context 
Except for the first study in Chapter 3, all studies reported in this thesis used 
experimental designs to test specific relationships between the variables of interest. 
This methodology offers excellent opportunities to s udy psychological processes 
on the basis of which future public acceptance of CCS can be predicted. For 
example, it enables the examination and identificaton of processes through which 
stakeholder communications affect public trust without contaminating the target 
population for future communications. Before CCS stakeholders start to inform 
members of the general public about their positions  the issue, with the insights 
derived from this thesis it has become possible to tailor their organizational 
communications accordingly. This type of research is important to conduct 
particularly in the early stages of CCS decision making, as it helps to predict 
factors that facilitate public acceptance rather than explaining afterwards what went 
wrong. The use of experimental paradigms makes it possible to try different types 
of communication strategies and to compare their effectiveness ahead of time, 
without interfering with real-life decision-making procedures concerning CCS at 
potential demonstration sites.  
A potential point of concern is whether the undergraduate student samples 
that have been examined in this thesis provide knowledge that can be generalized 
to broader populations. Indeed, there may be differences between students and 
members of the general public concerning their psychological properties that may 
cause members of the general public to respond differently to the stimuli examined 
in the current research than students did. In the current research, potentially 
relevant differences between samples of undergraduate students and broader 
samples of the general public may represent differences in average intelligence and 
general knowledge of scientific constructs relevant to CCS, such as carbon dioxide. 
In addition, compared to the general public, undergraduate students are likely to be 
more politically active implying that they might care more about how political 
decisions are made. 
While it is important to take such differences into account, they do not 
seem to represent significant barriers with regard to generalizing the current 




undergraduate students who did not receive explicit information about CCS were 
clearly not able to answer questions about CCS corre tly, indicating that 
knowledge about CCS among undergraduate students is as little as it is among the 
rest of the general public (see de Best-Waldhober et al., in press). Moreover, the 
importance of group voice in decision making seems independent of the research 
population in question because fairness and trustworthiness represent quite basic 
human values that are important to all and sundry. After all, people’s willingness to 
cooperate with authorities has previously been found to depend on the fairness of 
decision-making procedures, regardless of whether t research sample consisted 
of employees receiving unfair treatment from their supervisors (e.g., Bies & 
Shapiro, 1988), citizens thinking of their encounters with the police (Tyler & 
Folger, 1980) or undergraduate students not receiving oice in the amount of 
lottery tickets that they think they should receive (e.g., Van den Bos, Wilke, & 
Lind, 1998). All in all, at this stage of CCS decision making, the advantages of the 
experimental approach used in this research outweigh its disadvantages.  
Further research is needed to more specifically monitor and examine how 
the processes addressed in this thesis affect opinions of people living nearby an 
actual carbon dioxide storage site, as additional concerns are likely to play a role 
for this specific group. That is, participants in the current studies as well as 
members of the general public are more likely to accept CCS to the extent that they 
associate societal benefits with this technology. On-site residents, however, may be 
much more concerned with the personal risks that they associate with CCS than 
with the global or national benefits associated with CCS. At the same time, they 
may be especially sensitive to potential regional benefits (e.g., increased 
employment opportunities) that may be of less value to other people. 
Another difference between the general public and o-site residents is that 
it seems likely that people living nearby storage sit s are inclined to put even more 
weight on their trust in CCS stakeholders than members of the general public who 
are less directly affected by these measures. For the current research, I primarily 
focused on environmental NGOs and organizations in the oil and gas industry as it 
was considered important to select nationwide operating organizations that are 
known by many people and that are expected to act upon different motives. 
Because CCS will have significant environmental and economic consequences, 
focusing on environmental NGOs and industrial organiz tions was ideal in this 
regard. For on-site residents, however, other CCS stakeholders will also be 
relevant. For instance, in addition to industrial stakeholders and environmental 
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NGOs, trust in local (instead of national) governmet may be crucial to create 
acceptance of CCS. For these reasons, some of the current findings (for instance 
the finding that people’s judgments of the benefits as ociated with CCS correlated 
more strongly with acceptance of CCS than judgments of associated risks; see 
Chapter 2) should predict what happens with public ac eptance in general, but 
priorities may be different for on-site residents. 
 
Concluding remarks 
One of the main messages of this thesis is that public acceptance of CCS will not 
solely depend on the content of the information that is provided regarding the 
specific qualities of CCS, but also will depend to a considerable extent on he type 
of information (e.g., risks or benefits, environmental consequences or economic 
consequences), the source providing information (e.g., industrial stakeholders, 
environmental NGOs, government bodies), and the nature of the decision-making 
process (e.g., whether or not interest groups receive an opportunity to voice 
opinions). That is, people’s judgments of the magnitude of benefits associated with 
CCS depend upon whether they learn about these benefits from a source that they 
consider trustworthy or from a source that they do not consider trustworthy. 
Moreover, environmental NGOs seem to instigate more trust than industrial 
organizations because they are perceived to serve public rather than organizational 
interests. Industrial organizations may overcome being perceived as untrustworthy, 
however, by communicating a two-fold message that acknowledges their 
organizational interests while at the same time showing concern for public 
interests. Finally, members of the general public do not necessarily call for 
personal voice in CCS decision making as long as relevant parties such as 
environmental NGOs and industrial organizations are heard in the decision-making 
process. Such group-voice procedures instigate trust in decision-making 
authorities, which in turn leads to greater acceptance of decisions made, regardless 
of whether these decisions are in favor of or against CCS implementation. This 
finding indicates the importance of informing members of the general public about 
the way decisions about CCS are reached.  
In the mean time, global warming is becoming more and more apparent 
(e.g., the melting of the North Pole) and steps need to be taken to take away its 
cause: Ever-increasing carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere. An important 
strategy to reduce emissions of this greenhouse gas is to implement CCS on a large 




One thing may be clear from this thesis: Public acceptance of this complex and 
novel technology is highly dependent on the level of public trust in CCS 
stakeholders. I have outlined a number of factors that influence public trust in CCS 





Competence-based and integrity-based trust4 
 
reventing climate change is among the greatest environmental challenges 
facing the world today. In addition to saving on energy consumption and 
increasing the use of sustainable energy sources, implementation of recently 
developed carbon dioxide capture and storage technology (CCS) is currently 
considered an important option to achieve climate change mitigation. This 
technology involves the capture, transport, and long-term storage of carbon dioxide 
in underground sites, such as depleted gas fields.  
Interested organizations (e.g., industrial organizations, environmental 
NGOs) associate several environmental and economic risks and benefits with CCS 
(Huijts, Midden, & Meijnders, 2007). These organizations will take into account 
their assessments of these risks and benefits to determine their organizational 
positions on CCS implementation. Members of the general public, on the other 
hand, lack individual expertise about CCS (de Best-Waldhober, Daamen, & Faaij, 
in press; see also Chapter 4 of this thesis) and about scientific constructs such as 
carbon dioxide in general (Meijnders, Midden, & Wilke, 2001) to be able to 
accurately assess the risks and benefits of this new technology. As a consequence, 
and in line with previous research on other complex technological advancements 
(Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000), people will base their attitudes toward CCS on their 
assessments of the organizations having an involvement in CCS rather than on their 
personal knowledge about the issue.  
Lay attitudes toward CCS are relevant because a lack of public acceptance 
can severely reduce the viability of CCS. The 1995 case of Brent Spar illustrates 
this point. In this instance, industrial organization Shell preferred the deep-sea 
disposal over the onshore disposal of Brent Spar, its decommissioned oil storage 
and loading structure. Shell had assessed the environmental risks of deep-sea 
disposal and concluded that these were negligible. Environmental organization 
Greenpeace, however, portrayed the deep-sea disposal option as highly risky, 
                                                
4 This chapter is based on Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, and Daamen (2009a) and has 






which instigated considerable public opposition to Shell’s position on the issue. 
Ultimately, this lack of public acceptance forced Shell to develop an alternative to 
the deep-sea disposal of the Brent Spar (for a more detailed description of the Brent 
Spar case, see Löfstedt and Renn, 1997). In a similar vein, public acceptance will 
be crucial for the realization of CCS as a strategy to mitigate climate change. As 
such, it is highly relevant to examine how people deci e to accept or oppose CCS. 
This chapter addresses this issue. 
 
Trust in organizations 
Siegrist’s work on public acceptance of gene technology (Siegrist, 2000) served as 
a starting point for our inquiry. In this work, Siegrist showed that people’s trust in 
organizations that are responsible for the management and use of gene technology 
affected their perceptions of the risks and benefits associated with this technology. 
He further showed that individual perceptions of risks and benefits affected 
acceptance of the technology. In other words, Siegrist’s research suggests a causal 
model in which lay judgments concerning risks and benefits associated with 
modern technologies are expected to mediate the influence of trust in organizations 
on public acceptance of such technologies. Eiser and colleagues (Eiser, Miles, & 
Frewer, 2002) have referred to this model as the causal chain account of trust (see 
Figure 2.1).  
To be able to understand how trust in CCS stakeholdrs affects lay 
perceptions of risks, perceptions of benefits, and cceptance of CCS, we first need 
to identify the factors that may cause people to trust these organizations in the first 
place. It stands to reason that this issue has received considerable scholarly 
attention in the field of risk research. Risk researchers have shown that people’s 
trust in organizations that are responsible for themanagement of hazardous 
activities and complex technologies may depend upon several factors, including 
whether organizations are perceived to be accurate and objective, concerned with 
the public interest, consistent and predictable, honest and fair, and to have expertise 
relevant to the issue at hand (for an overview, see Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). 
It has been suggested that these factors can roughly be classified into two 
overarching categories (Jungermann, Pfister, & Fischer, 1996; Metlay, 1999), the 
first comprising of indicators of organizational competence and the second 
comprising of indicators of organizational integrity. This perspective on trust 
recognizes that people may trust an organization because they think it has a lot of 
expertise about and experience with the issue under consideration, and/or because 
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they consider it to be open and honest in its communications and concerned with 
the public interest. Accordingly, trust based on organizational experience and 
expertise can be referred to as competence-based trust; trust based on 








Distinguishing between competence-based trust and integrity-based trust 
may yield important insights into how trust in organizations affects public 
perceptions of new technologies such as CCS. Previous research has already 
suggested the relevance of distinguishing between th se types of trust (Kim, Dirks, 
Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). For example, Kim 
and colleagues (Kim et al., 2004) showed that the success of strategies to repair 
trust depends on the type of trust that was initially violated. Trust was more 
successfully repaired by means of apologizing than by denial when the trust 
violation concerned a matter of competence. When th trust violation concerned a 
matter of integrity, however, trust was more successfully repaired by denying 












trust can have important implications for subsequent evaluations of persons and 
organizations. Thus far, however, it has remained unclear whether distinguishing 
between competence-based trust and integrity-based trust has implications for 
people’s judgments of the risks and benefits associated with new technologies and 
their acceptance of these technologies. The goal of the present research was to 
address this issue. 
Drawing a distinction between competence-based trust and integrity-based 
trust is important, we argue, to be able to understand the process through which 
trust affects lay attitudes toward new technologies. This argument has its roots in 
findings from person-perception and impression-formation research, which suggest 
that people tend to weigh positive information about competence more heavily than 
negative information about competence (Reeder, Hesson-McInnis, Krohse, & 
Scialabba, 2001), but tend to weigh negative information about integrity more 
heavily than positive information about integrity (Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay, & 
Ketelaar, 2005). In other words, positivity biases are more likely to occur in the 
ability domain, while negativity biases are more likely to occur in the integrity 
domain (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). 
In line with the abovementioned information asymmetry, we predict 
positive rather than negative information about the competence of an organization 
to affect lay attitudes toward CCS. More specifically, we expect people to pay 
attention to the organizational position concerning CCS when the organization is 
seen as competent, which implies that knowledge of the organizational position is 
more relevant when competence-based trust is high rather than low. In the case of 
high competence-based trust, we anticipate people t become more positive about 
CCS when the organization is a proponent than when it would have been an 
opponent. In the case of low competence-based trust, however, the organizational 
position is less likely to influence lay attitudes toward CCS.   
By contrast, we predict negative rather than positive information about the 
integrity of an organization to influence lay attitudes toward CCS. Thus, compared 
to the way people are expected to use competence-based trust in the attitude 
formation process, we predict the reverse relation to hold true for integrity-based 
trust. When an organization is seen to lack integriy, people are likely to be 
skeptical about the position advocated by the organization and will tend to run 
counter to rather than go along with this position. In other words, when integrity-
based trust is low, people will become less positive when the organization is a 
proponent (compared to an opponent) of CCS implementatio . Consistent with the 
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information asymmetry principle, the effects of organizational position on people’s 
attitudes toward CCS should be less pronounced in the case of high as opposed to 
low integrity-based trust. 
 
Overview of the current studies 
The goal of the present research was to test the causal chain account of trust for 
both competence-based and integrity-based trust in the context of CCS. The vast 
majority of previous research that focused on public acceptance of new 
technologies and hazardous activities in relation to the variables in the causal chain 
model (i.e., trust in organizations, perceived risks, and perceived benefits) has 
relied on correlational data (e.g., Maeda & Miyahara, 2003; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 
2005; Siegrist, 1999, 2000; Tanaka, 2004; Tokushige, Akimoto, & Tomoda, 2007). 
To complement this previous work, we used an experimental approach suited to 
test our predictions with regard to the differential implications of competence-
based trust and integrity-based trust for acceptance of CCS. 
In two experiments, we manipulated the provision of trust-related 
information about an organization involved in CCS decision making as well as the 
position of this organization regarding CCS, but the nature of the trust-related 
information was different in the two studies. In Study 2.1, which focused on 
competence-based trust, information about the competenc  of the organization was 
manipulated by informing participants about its (lack of) experience with and 
expertise about issues concerning carbon dioxide. In Study 2.2, which addressed 
integrity-based trust, information about (lack of) integrity of the organization was 
manipulated by informing participants about organiztional honesty, openness, and 
concern for public interests. In both studies, we tested whether the causal chain 




Study 2.1 aimed to examine the prediction that organizational position concerning 
CCS implementation (pro versus con) more strongly affects people’s acceptance of 
CCS in the case of high competence-based trust thanin the case of low 
competence-based trust (Hypothesis 1). In accordance with the causal chain 
account, we further predicted people’s perceptions f the magnitude of risks and 
benefits associated with CCS to mediate the effect of ompetence-based trust and 





Participants and design 
The sample consisted of 73 undergraduate students from Leiden University (38 
male and 35 female). These participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental conditions of the 2 (competence-based trust: high vs. low) by 2 
(organizational position regarding CCS implementation: pro vs. con) between-
subjects factorial design.  
 
Procedure 
Participants read a brief description about recently developed CCS technology and 
about “Organization A”, an organization involved in the decision-making process 
concerning the implementation of this technology. We gave the organization this 
name in order to exclude the possibility that the actu l identity of the organization 
or previous knowledge about this organization would interfere with the 
manipulations. We informed participants that the organization really existed, but 
that is was denoted in this way for the purpose of nsuring the anonymity of the 
organization. Next, we provided participants with some information about 
organization A allegedly to give them some general background information. This 
information contained the experimental manipulations. 
Participants in the high competence-based trust conditi  read: 
“Organization A is an organization that has quite a lot of knowledge about and 
experience with issues concerning carbon dioxide (CO2). In fact, the information 
that Organization A provides on this topic is often accurate”. Participants in the 
low competence-based trust condition read: “Organization A is an organization that 
has limited knowledge about and experience with issues concerning carbon dioxide 
(CO2). In fact, the information that organization A provides on this topic is not 
always accurate” (italics added to highlight the differences between the two 
stimulus materials). 
Next, we manipulated the position of Organization A regarding CCS. 
Dependent upon experimental condition, participant read that Organization A is a 
proponent or that Organization A is an opponent of CCS implementation. After 
these manipulations, participants read that, when Organization A was asked to 
evaluate CCS, it referred to two risks and two benefits associated with CCS. 
Participants read about these risks and benefits, which included an environmental 
benefit, an economic benefit, an environmental risk, and an economic risk. For 
example, the environmental benefit provided was that CCS would help to mitigate 
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climate change, while the environmental risk was that CCS would go at the 
expense of more sustainable solutions. We varied th order of presentation of the 
risks and benefits to rule out order effects. Finally, participants completed a 
questionnaire including the main dependent variables and manipulation checks. 
 
Dependent variables 
Manipulation checks. The manipulation check for trust in Organization A consisted 
of three items (α = .95), “To what extent do you think Organization A is 
trustworthy?”, “To what extent are you willing to rely on the judgments of 
Organization A?”, and “To what extent do you trust Organization A?” (1 = not at 
all, 7 = very much). The manipulation check for the position of Organiz tion A 
with regard to CCS consisted of the question “Is Organization A an opponent or a 
proponent of CCS technology?” (1 = proponent, 2 = opponent). We asked these 
manipulation checks at the end of the questionnaire.  
Acceptance of CCS. Acceptance of CCS was assessed with four items (α = 
.91). Examples of items were “I will support the actual implementation of this 
recently developed CCS technology.” and “I am willing to pay more for a product 
if CCS is applied during the production process.” (1 = completely agree, 7 = 
completely disagree). 
Perceived magnitude of risks and benefits. Perceived magnitude of the 
risks associated with CCS was assessed for the environmental risk and the 
economic risk separately.  For each risk, participants nswered the questions: “Can 
you give an indication about how you judge the size of this risk associated with 
CCS?” (1 = no risk at all, 7 = great risk), and “Can you give an indication about 
how you judge the importance of this risk associated with CCS?” (1 = not 
important at all, 7 = very important). We used an identical procedure to assess 
perceived benefits associated with CCS. Scores on these questions were averaged 





We conducted analysis of variance (ANOVA) with organiz tional competence 
(high vs. low) and organizational position (pro vs.con) as independent variables 
and trust in Organization A as dependent variable in order to check whether the 




organization. This analysis revealed a strong main effect for organizational 
competence, F(1, 69) = 94.31, p < .001, η2 = .58. Participants who read that the 
organization had knowledge and experience concerning issues related to carbon 
dioxide reported more trust in the organization (M = 5.24, SD = 0.82) than 
participants who read that the organization had only limited knowledge and 
experience (M = 3.52, SD = 0.71). This analysis also revealed a marginally 
significant main effect for organizational position, F(1, 69) = 3.88, p < .06, η2 = 
.05, indicating that participants who read that the organization was a proponent of 
CCS implementation had slightly less trust in the organization (M = 4.20, SD = 
1.20) than participants who read that the organization was an opponent of CCS (M 
= 4.58, SD = 1.10). There was no interaction effect on this manipulation check, 
F(1, 69) = 0.25, ns. As such, we successfully manipulated the level of competence-
based trust in Organization A independent of organizational position.  
With regard to the organizational-position manipulation, all participants in 
the pro-CCS condition correctly answered that Organization A was a proponent of 
CCS implementation. All participants in the con-CCS condition correctly answered 
that the organization was an opponent of CCS implementation. 
 
Acceptance of CCS 
We conducted an ANOVA with competence-based trust (high vs. low) and 
organizational position (pro vs. con) as independent variables and acceptance of 
CCS as dependent variable. This analysis revealed main effects of competence-
based trust, F(1, 69) = 4.98, p < .03, η2 = .07, and organizational position, F(1, 69) 
= 7.87, p < .01, η2 = .10. These effects were qualified by a significant Competence-
based Trust by Organizational Position interaction, F(1  69) = 21.18, p < .001, η2 = 
.24. As predicted, simple main effect analyses revealed that, in the case of high 
competence-based trust, participants accepted CCS to a greater extent when the 
organization was a proponent (M = 4.71, SD = 0.79) than when it was an opponent 
of CCS (M = 3.28, SD = 0.76), F(1, 70) = 26.75, p < .001. In the case of low 
competence-based trust, however, participants’ acceptance of CCS did not depend 
on whether the organization was a proponent (M = 4.25, SD = 1.00) or an opponent 
(M = 4.60, SD = 0.73), F(1, 70) = 1.51, p > .22. These results support the 
prediction formulated in Hypothesis 1 and indicate that people use high rather than 
low competence-based trust as a guide in attitude formation about CCS. 
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Perceived magnitude of risks and benefits 
We also performed ANOVA to test whether competence-based trust and 
organizational position affected people’s perceptions f the magnitude of risks and 
benefits referred to by the organization. With regad to perceived magnitude of 
risks, the analysis revealed a main effect of organizational position, F(1, 69) = 
7.98, p < .01, η2 = .10, qualified by a significant Competence-based Trust by 
Organizational Position interaction, F(1, 69) = 11.09, p < .001, η2 = .14. Simple 
main effect analyses revealed that, in the case of high competence-based trust, 
participants who had read that the organization was a proponent of CCS judged the 
risks associated with CCS to be smaller (M = 4.22, SD = 0.83) than participants 
who had read that the organization was an opponent of CCS (M = 5.12, SD = 0.53), 
F(1, 70) = 19.44, p < .001. As predicted, in the case of low organizational 
competence, participants’ judgments of risks did not depend on whether the 
organization was a proponent (M = 4.59, SD = 0.49) or an opponent (M = 4.52, SD 
= 0.60), F(1, 70) = 0.13, p > .70. Thus, in line with predictions, perceptions of risks 
were only influenced by organizational position when competence-based trust was 
high. 
The reversed pattern of results appeared with regard to perceived 
magnitude of benefits associated with CCS. The analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of organizational position, F(1, 69) = 14.11, p < .001, η2 = .17, and a 
main effect of competence-based trust, F(1, 69) = 4.12, p < .05, η2 = .06, which 
were qualified by a significant Competence-based Trust by Organizational Position 
interaction, F(1, 69) = 31.42, p < .001, η2 = .31. Simple main effect analyses 
revealed that, in the case of high competence-based trust, participants judged the 
benefits of CCS to be larger when the organization was a proponent (M = 5.56, SD 
= 0.45) compared to an opponent of CCS (M = 4.15, SD = 0.58), F(1, 70) = 43.02, 
p < .001. In the case of low competence-based trust, par icipants’ judgments of the 
benefits did not depend on whether the organization was a proponent (M = 5.02, 
SD = 0.86) or an opponent (M = 5.30, SD = 0.62), F(1, 70) = 1.61, p > .21. Thus, in 
line with predictions, perceptions of benefits were only influenced by 
organizational position when competence-based trust was high. These findings 
support the causal relationship between trust and perce tions of risks and benefits 








We used the stepwise procedure recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) to test 
whether perceptions of the magnitude of risks and benefits mediated the 
Competence-based Trust by Organizational Position interaction on people’s 
acceptance of CCS (i.e., the causal chain account as formulated in Hypothesis 2). 
First, mediation requires a significant effect of the predictor variable (i.e., the 
interaction effect) on the outcome variable (i.e., acceptance of CCS) as well as a 
significant effect of the predictor variable on the proposed mediator(s). Both these 
requirements were met, as indicated by the results reported above. Mediation 
further requires a significant association between th  proposed mediator(s) and the 
outcome variable after controlling for the independt variables and their 
interaction. Whereas perceived magnitude of benefits associated with CCS was 
significantly related to acceptance of CCS (β = .64, p < .001), perceived magnitude 
of the risks was not (β = -.09, p > .43). Note that the zero-order correlation betwen 
risk judgments and acceptance of CCS was not significa t as well (r = -.18, ns). As 
such, only perceived benefits can potentially mediat  the Competence-based Trust 
by Organizational Position interaction on people’s acceptance of CCS. Finally, 
mediation requires a significant reduction of the dir ct effect on acceptance of CCS 
after including perceived magnitude of benefits as a mediator in the equation. 
Consistent with the mediation model, the interaction effect dropped to 
nonsignificance after introduction of perceived benefits in the equation (β = .23, p 
> .17). A Sobel test (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; 
Sobel, 1982) confirmed that the reduction of the dir ct effect was significant (z = 
4.03, p < .001), indicating mediation. Hence, mediation analysis supported the 
causal chain account of trust with perceived magnitude of benefits as a mediator 
(the second element in the chain), but not with perceived magnitude of risks as a 
mediator.5 
 
                                                
5 Preacher and colleagues (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) recently launched an 
alternative method (using bootstrapping) to test for mediation when two independent 
variables interact to influence the proposed mediator, as is the case in our study. We also 
used this method of analysis and found that when competence-based trust was high, the 
conditional indirect effect of organizational position on acceptance of CCS through 
perceived benefits was significant, because the 95%confidence interval (0.57; 1.46) did not 
include zero (0). When competence-based trust was low, however, the conditional indirect 
effect was not significant, because the 95% confidece interval (-0.66; 0.12) did include 
zero (0). These results provide additional support for he mediation model. 
  




Study 2.1 has focused on the impact of competence-bas d trust in (and the position 
of) an organization involved in CCS decision making on people’s risk and benefit 
perceptions and their acceptance of CCS. Results confirmed our reasoning about 
the higher diagnostic value of high competence-based trust relative to low 
competence-based trust: People’s perceptions of the magnitude of risks and 
benefits as well as their acceptance of CCS were influe ced by the organizational 
position in the case of high competence-based trust, but not in the case of low 
competence-based trust. Results also largely supported the causal chain account of 




The aim of Study 2.2 was to examine our predictions regarding the effects of 
integrity-based trust. We hypothesized people to run counter to rather than to go 
along with the organizational position in the case of low integrity-based trust, while 
effects of the organizational position would be less pronounced in the case of high 
integrity-based trust (Hypothesis 3). In accordance with the causal chain model, we 
further hypothesized that perceptions of risks and benefits would mediate the 
relationship between integrity-based trust and the organizational position on the 
one hand, and people’s acceptance of CCS on the other (Hypothesis 4). We used an 
experimental design that paralleled that of Study 2.1 to test these hypotheses, with 
the only difference that participants in Study 2.2 were informed about 
organizational integrity (in terms of honesty and con ern) instead of organizational 
competence as in Study 2.1. 
 
Method 
Participants and design 
The sample consisted of 75 undergraduate students from Leiden University (36 
male and 39 female). These participants were randomly allocated to one of the four 
experimental conditions of the 2 (integrity-based trust: high vs. low) by 2 
(organizational position regarding CCS implementation: pro vs. con) between-








The procedure of Study 2.2 largely followed that of Study 2.1. Participants first 
read a brief description about recently developed CCS technology, after which 
Organization A was introduced. This time, however, the information about 
Organization A contained the manipulation of organiz tional integrity. Participants 
in the high integrity-based trust condition read: 
  
“Organization A is known as rather honest. In the past, the 
organization turned out to offer objective information at all times, 
in spite of the organizational interests. Furthermore, the 
organization has recently been proclaimed to be one of the most 
reliable organizations by the Board of Journalism. According to 
the Board’s report, one of the reasons for this proclamation was 
the organization’s virtually constant willingness to be open about 
their activities and to answer critical questions. Furthermore, 
information offered by the organization has hardly ever been 
misleading.” 
 
Participants in the low integrity-based trust condition read:  
 
“Organization A is known as rather dishonest. In the past, the 
organization turned out not to offer objective information at all 
times, dependent on the organizational interests. Furthermore, the 
organization has recently been proclaimed to be one of the least 
reliable organizations by the Board of Journalism. According to 
the Board’s report, one of the reasons for this proclamation was 
the organization’s seldom willingness to be open about their 
activities and to answer critical questions. Furthermore, 
information offered by the organization has often been 
misleading.” (italics added to highlight the differences between the 
two texts).  
 
Next, we manipulated the position of Organization A regarding CCS, after 
which participants read the risks and benefits associated with CCS that the 
organization referred to. Finally, participants completed the questionnaire that 
included the dependent variables (acceptance of CCS, α = .89; perceived 
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magnitude of risks, α = .73; perceived magnitude of benefits, α = .83) and the 
manipulation checks (trust, α = .97; organizational position). 
 
Results 
Manipulation checks  
We performed an ANOVA with organizational integrity and organizational 
position as independent variables and trust in the organization as dependent 
variable. This analysis revealed a strong main effect or organizational integrity 
only, F(1, 71) = 65.83, p < .001, η2 = .48. As intended, participants in the high-
integrity condition (M = 5.11, SD = 0.87) trusted the organization more than 
participants in the low-integrity condition (M = 3.05, SD = 1.24). Thus, we 
successfully manipulated integrity-based trust in Organization A.  
With regard to the organizational-position manipulation, all participants in 
the pro-CCS condition correctly answered that Organization A was a proponent of 
CCS implementation, whereas all participants in the con-CCS condition correctly 
answered that Organization A was an opponent of CCSimplementation.  
 
Acceptance of CCS 
We conducted an ANOVA with integrity-based trust (high vs. low) and 
organizational position (pro vs. con) as independent variables and acceptance of 
CCS as dependent variable. This analysis revealed th  predicted Integrity-based 
Trust by Organizational Position interaction, F(1, 71) = 9.56, p < .01, η2 = .12. No 
main effects were observed. Additional simple main effect analyses revealed that, 
in the case of low integrity-based trust, participants accepted CCS more when the 
organization was an opponent (M = 4.72, SD = 1.10) compared to a proponent of 
CCS (M = 3.59, SD = 1.31), F(1, 72) = 8.07, p < .01. As expected, there was no 
reliable effect of organizational position on participants’ acceptance of CCS in the 
case of high integrity-based trust, F(1, 72) = 2.77, p = .10, although participants 
tended to accept CCS to a greater extent when the organization was a proponent (M 
= 4.78, SD = 1.23) compared to an opponent of CCS implementatio  (M = 4.11, 
SD = 1.39). These results support Hypothesis 3, which stated that people would run 
counter to the organizational position in the case of low integrity-based trust, while 
effects of the organizational position would be less pronounced in the case of high 






Perceived magnitude of risks and benefits 
We performed ANOVA to test whether integrity-based trust and organizational 
position affected perceptions of the risks and benefits communicated by the 
organization. With regard to perceived magnitude of risks, the analysis revealed a 
main effect of organizational position only, F(1, 69) = 4.27, p < .05. Surprisingly, 
participants who read that the organization was a proponent of CCS judged the 
risks associated with CCS to be somewhat higher (M = 4.87, SD = 0.92) than 
participants who read that the organization was an opponent of CCS (M = 4.36, SD 
= 1.21), regardless of integrity-based trust. This re ult is inconsistent with the 
causal chain account, on the basis of which we predicted to find a significant 
Integrity-based Trust by Organization Position interaction.  
With regard to perceived magnitude of benefits associated with CCS, no 
reliable main effects were observed, but the Integrity-based Trust by 
Organizational Position interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 71) = 2.77, p = 
.10. η2 = .04. The pattern of means was in line with predictions though, in that 
participants tended to run counter to the position of an untrustworthy organization.  
 
Mediation analysis  
We used the stepwise procedure recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) to test 
whether perceptions of the magnitude of benefits mediat d the Integrity-based 
Trust by Organizational Position interaction on acceptance of CCS (Hypothesis 4). 
As reported above, we found the Integrity-based Trust by Organizational Position 
interaction effect on perceived magnitude of the benefits (i.e., the proposed 
mediator), although it only reached marginal statistical significance (β = .34, p = 
.10). We entered the predictor variables and their interaction together with 
perceived benefits in a regression analysis with acceptance of CCS as the outcome 
variable. Although we obtained the required effect of the proposed mediator on 
acceptance of CCS (β = .65, p < .001), the direct effect of Integrity-based Trust by 
Organization Position on acceptance remained significa t (β = .38, p < .02) and 
was not significantly reduced (Sobel z = 1.63, p = .10).6 We disregarded perceived 
risks as a potential mediating variable in this study because we did not find the 
required interaction effect. As such, we conclude that he effect of integrity-based 
                                                
6 The bootstrapping procedure recommended by Preacher nd colleagues (2007) confirmed 
these results: When integrity-based trust was low, the conditional indirect effect of 
organizational position on acceptance of CCS through perceived benefits was not 
significant (p = .13) because the 95% confidence interval (-1.00; 0. 9) included zero (0), 
while the same holds true for high integrity-based trust (p = .46). 
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trust in interaction with organizational position oacceptance of CCS was neither 




Study 2.2 has focused on the impact of integrity-based trust in (and the position of) 
an organization involved in decision making about CCS on people’s risk and 
benefit perceptions and their acceptance of CCS. In line with predictions, people 
ran counter to the organizational position in the case of integrity-based trust, while 
the effect of organizational position on acceptance of CCS was only marginal in 
the case of high integrity-based trust. We did not find evidence for the causal chain 
model’s prediction that perceived risks and benefits mediated the relationship 
between integrity-based trust and organizational position on the one hand, and 




Carbon dioxide capture and storage technology (CCS) is currently considered an 
important climate change mitigation option, but public acceptance will be crucial 
for successful implementation of this technology. On the basis of the causal model 
proposed by Siegrist (2000) we hypothesized people’s trust in organizations 
involved in CCS decision making to affect their perceptions of the magnitude of 
risks and benefits associated with CCS, which in tur were expected to affect their 
acceptance of CCS. We extended the causal chain model by istinguishing between 
competence-based trust in organizations (i.e., trust based on organizational 
experience and expertise) and integrity-based trustin organizations (i.e., trust based 
on organizational honesty and concern). Moreover, we tested the causal chain 
account of trust for both these types of trust by means of experimental designs, 
thereby complementing previous work that used correlational data to test this 
model. 
Our research demonstrates the importance of public trust in CCS 
stakeholders by showing that competence-based trust and integrity-based trust in 
organizations affect people’s acceptance of CCS differently. Study 2.1 showed that 
people’s judgments about the magnitude of risks and benefits as well as their 
acceptance of CCS were affected by the organizational position only in the case of 




people followed the organizational position in that they accepted CCS to a greater 
extent when the organization was a proponent rather than an opponent of CCS. 
Study 2.2 further supported our reasoning by showing that reversed effects occur in 
the case of integrity-based trust: Organizational position reliably affected people’s 
responses only when integrity-based trust was low. In this case, that is, people ran 
counter to the organizational position and became more negative about CCS when 
the organization was a proponent compared to an opponent of CCS. These studies 
support our reasoning based on the information asymmetry principle in ability and 
integrity judgments. 
The current experimental research offers support for the causal chain 
account of trust, but this was only the case for competence-based trust. As 
predicted, perceived benefits (but not perceived risks) mediated the interaction 
effect of competence-based trust and organizational position on people’s 
acceptance of CCS. In the case of integrity-based trust, however, people seemed to 
arrive at their attitudes toward CCS through a different process. Consistent with 
Ajzen (2001) who noted that attitudes can either be cognition-based or emotion-
based, we argue that competence-based trust may have activated a cognitive 
response mode that is relevant for judging the magnitude of prespecified risks and 
benefits (which is a cognitive task). Accordingly, people’s acceptance of CCS can 
be considered the result of cognitive judgments (i.e., perceived risks and benefits) 
in the case of competence-based trust.  
Integrity-based trust, on the other hand, may have activated an emotional 
response mode that is less likely to affect cognitive judgments about risks and 
benefits. Maybe people’s level of acceptance of CCS can be considered a more 
immediate response on the basis of emotions activated by integrity-based trust, 
using judgments of benefits as a way to retrospectiv ly justify their own position 
about CCS. People may have reasoned like: “I do not trust this organization. 
Because it is a proponent of CCS, I oppose its position and will reject CCS 
because…the benefits of CCS are not that great after ll.”.7 Future research may 
                                                
7 Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure revealed support for this reasoning. The marginal 
Integrity-based Trust by Organizational Position interaction on perceived benefits (i.e., the 
outcome variable) dropped to nonsignificance (β = -.09, p = .60) when people’s acceptance 
of CCS (i.e., the newly proposed mediator) was included in the analysis. The reduction of 
the direct effect was significant, Sobel z = 2.87, p < .01, indicating mediation. Moreover, 
tests of the conditional indirect effects (Preacher et al., 2007) showed that acceptance of 
CCS mediated the effect of organizational position on perceived magnitude of the benefits 
in the case of low integrity-based trust (95% confidence interval: -1.27; -0.22; p < .01), but 
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more explicitly test the validity of this post hoc explanation, for example by also 
assessing the emotions that people experience in addition to their more cognitive 
judgments about risk and benefits. 
The differences observed in the current studies between competence-based 
and integrity-based trust yield an interesting addition to the debate about the most 
accurate order of variables related to public acceptance of new technologies and 
hazardous activities (i.e., trust in organizations, perceived risks, and perceived 
benefits). On the one hand, our research supports the (cognitive) causal chain 
account for competence-based trust, but it also suggests that alternative (more 
emotion-based) processes may play a role in the cas of integrity-based trust. The 
processes that we propose (i.e., justification of one’s willingness to accept CCS by 
means of judgments about benefits) resembles the associationist view of trust 
(Eiser et al., 2002; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2005) in that in this view perceptions of 
the magnitude of benefits are also considered to be the result rather than the cause 
of a general attitude toward CCS. Accordingly, distinguishing between 
competence-based and integrity-based trust may help to resolve the debate between 
the two competing theoretical accounts of trust. Both accounts may be valid, but 
for different forms of trust.  
The current results suggest that the perceived benefits dominate people’s 
level of acceptance of CCS implementation, regardless of the potential downsides. 
Trust affected people’s risk perceptions in Study 2.1, but in both studies perceived 
risks were less relevant to people’s acceptance of CCS. Nevertheless, by no means 
do we claim that people’s perceptions of risks have no predictive value for their 
acceptance of CCS. After all, we cannot rule out the possibility that the results 
regarding the marginal role of risk perceptions in our studies can be attributed to, 
for example, specific characteristic of the risks presented (e.g., lack of catastrophic 
potential) or the fact that we had participants judge prespecified risk (rather than 
their own intuitive thoughts about potential risks). Note, however, that results of 
the current research are in line with previous research suggesting that public 
acceptance of new technologies (including CCS) more strongly relates to perceived 
benefits than to perceived risks (Siegrist, 2000; Tokushige et al., 2007). Identifying 
the conditions under which perceptions of benefits outweigh the importance of 
                                                                                                                 
not in the case of high integrity-based trust (95% confidence interval: -0.12; 0.99; p = .14). 
These results suggest that people directly display negative reactions to organizational 
positions when integrity-based trust is low, and may use judgments of the magnitude of 





perceived risks or vice versa is an issue to address in future research. For example, 
an interesting possibility for future on-site research is to examine whether risk 
perceptions may be a more potent determinant of acceptance of CCS among 
residents living nearby a storage site, while benefits associated with CCS may be a 
key factor for acceptance of those residing at a larger distance.  
All in all, our research highlights the role of public trust in CCS 
stakeholders in the process of creating public acceptance of CCS. Accordingly, 
CCS is promising as a strategy to achieve climate change mitigation, but whether 
or not it will actually be employed does not solely depend on specific 
characteristics of this technology but on characteristics of the organizations 





Organizational motives and communications8 
 
reventing climate change is among the greatest environmental challenges 
facing the world today. Experts agree that climate change has important 
(negative) consequences for environments and societies (see, e.g., IPCC, 
2007; Sundblad, Biel, & Gärling, 2007), and that the increase of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere is related to climate change. An important potential strategy to 
mitigate climate change is through implementation of recently developed carbon 
dioxide capture and storage technology (CCS). This technology involves 1) the 
capture of carbon dioxide in power plants at release, 2) the transport of the carbon 
dioxide captured to underground sites, such as depleted gas fields, and 3) the long-
term storage of the carbon dioxide in these sites. Although CCS is potentially 
promising, successful implementation of CCS will depend on public acceptance of 
this technology. In turn, public acceptance of such new technologies depends to a 
considerable extent on people’s trust in the organizations involved in the 
development, decision making, and use of these technologies (Siegrist, 2000; see 
also Chapter 2 of this thesis). In the case of CCS, these organizations include 
environmental NGOs, industrial organizations, scientific institutions, and 
government bodies. 
Imagine you are part of the management of an industrial profit 
organization involved in the development of CCS technology. You are positive that 
CCS will help to mitigate climate change and, therefore, you think it should be 
implemented on a large scale. Because you are aware th t your organization may 
be seen by the general public as focusing on economic gain rather than anything 
else, you instruct your PR-staff to prepare information to communicate the 
environmental benefits of this technology. The idea underlying this strategy is that 
the communication of public-serving arguments may create a more favorable 
impression of the organization. The present research examines the likelihood that 
such communications have positive effects on company evaluations, which is 
important to achieve public support for the introduction of CCS technology.  
                                                
8 This chapter is based on Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, and Daamen (in press) and has 





We designed this research to examine trust in organizations involved in 
CCS as a function of inferred organizational motives and organizational 
communications. We aim to show that inferred public-serving motives instigate 
more public trust in organizations than inferred organization-serving motives. 
Moreover, we aim to show that it is the degree of c ngruency between 
organizational communications and inferred motives rather than the objective 
content of organizational communications that leads to public trust in 
organizations. Finally, we aim to demonstrate that is relationship is mediated by 
perceived honesty. To achieve these goals, we firstassessed how inferred 
organizational motives relate to public trust in organizations in a field study, and 
then conducted two experimental studies to examine the effects of different 
communications on trust in organizations in more detail. 
 
Trust  
Public trust is important because the effective functio ing of organizations in 
society depends on the extent to which people trusthe e organizations (Fukuyama, 
1995). Research in the field of risk perception and risk communication indeed 
suggests that under conditions in which personal knowledge about an issue is 
lacking, public opinions depend on the extent to which members of the general 
public trust the organizations involved in the issue (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). 
For example, previous research showed that people are more willing to accept the 
use of gene technology to the extent that they trust hose responsible for regulating 
and using this technology (Siegrist, 1999, 2000).  
Trust is often defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations f the intentions or behavior 
of another” (following Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). Thus, 
whether people have positive expectations about the intentions of an organization 
influences their trust in this organization. This process is illustrated by research on 
the relationship between trust and organizational reputations (e.g., De Ruyter, 
Wetzels, & Kleijnen, 2001; Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky, & Vitale, 2000). For example, 
research by Jarvenpaa and colleagues (2000) indicates that assessments of the 
trustworthiness of internet book- and travel stores d pended upon the reputations of 
these stores. The more a person perceived a positive organizational reputation, the 
more this organization was trusted. In fact, people were more willing to buy 
products from these organizations as a result of higher levels of trust. These 
findings show the benefits of achieving public trus. Similarly, in the light of 
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environmental issues such as decision making about CCS implementation, public 
trust in CCS stakeholders is important to consider and depends upon how people 
perceive these organizations. 
 
Organizational motives 
We propose that people decide whether or not to trust an organization on the basis 
of the motives that they think underlie the policy and actions of the organization. 
Organizational motives can be thought of as the reasons why an organization 
engages in certain actions and initiatives. For example, CCS stakeholders may be 
seen by the general public as being motivated by a prospect of economic benefits, 
or by a prospect of contributing to a cleaner environment. Because members of the 
general public will tend to value certain motives over others, they can be expected 
to trust certain organizations more than others, baed on the inferences they make 
about the motives underlying the policy and actions f these organizations.   
When examining organizational motives, two principal types of motives 
can be distinguished. Public-serving motives reflect organizational concern for 
public welfare and benefits of people outside the organization (i.e., members of the 
general public). Organization-serving motives refer to a focus of the organization 
on economic gain and maximization of benefits for the organization itself 
(Forehand & Grier, 2003). In the literature, various other labels have been used to 
refer to these two types of motives, such as altruistic versus egoistic motives (e.g., 
Batson, 1994, 1996), other-centered versus self-center d motives (e.g., Ellen, 
Mohr, & Webb, 2000), societal interest versus self-interest (e.g., Funk, 2000), and 
external goals versus internal goals (e.g., Nilsson, Von Borgstede, & Biel, 2004). 
We adopt the terminology proposed by Forehand and Grier (2003) to distinguish 
between public-serving and organization-serving motives because this terminology 
best matches the organizational level of the research.9  
We anticipated public trust to be higher for organiz tions that are 
perceived to be guided by public-serving motives than for organizations that are 
perceived to act upon organization-serving motives. Although it seems likely that 
public-serving motives (such as concern for environme tal issues, public health 
and safety) and organization-serving motives (such as increasing organizational 
profits, improving organizational image) have a major impact on public 
perceptions of the organization, it is yet unknown how these different motives 
                                                





influence public trust in organizations. In Study 3.1, we examined the effect of 
inferred public-serving and organizational-serving motives on public trust in CCS 
stakeholders. In Study 3.2 and Study 3.3, we further examined how organizational 
communications about public-serving and organization-serving motives affect 




Study 3.1 examined whether people tend to ascribe particular motives to particular 
CCS stakeholders. Moreover, we assessed how these motive inferences affect 
public trust in these organizations, which included three environmental NGOs and 
three industrial stakeholders. As argued above, we hypothesized that trust in these 
CCS stakeholders would depend on people’s beliefs about whether these 
organizations act upon public-serving motives or act upon organization-serving 
motives. Specifically, we predicted that members of the general public would 
generally expect environmental NGOs to be concerned with CCS out of public-
serving motives (Hypothesis 1a). At the same time, w  predicted that members of 
the general public would generally expect industrial organizations to be involved in 
CCS out of organization-serving motives (Hypothesis 1b). Second, we 
hypothesized that the overall level of trust in NGOs would be higher than the level 
of trust in industry (Hypothesis 2). Third, we hypothesized that higher levels of 
trust in NGOs would be due to the nature of the infrred organizational motive 
(Hypothesis 3). Because differences in public trust may also be caused by 
differential levels of perceived competence of the organizations in question (see 
Chapter 2 of this thesis), we measured perceived organizational competence to rule 
out the possibility that different levels of trust were caused by differences in 





A sample of 264 Dutch citizens completed a questionnaire on the World Wide Web 
in which they answered questions concerning either an environmental NGO or an 
industrial organization. Advertisements in national ewspapers and on the internet 
served to make people aware of the questionnaire. A lottery for 25 euros gift 
vouchers served as an incentive to participate. The sample consisted of individuals 
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between 18 and 88 years of age (M = 38.05, SD = 14.35) of which 25.8 percent was 
male. We asked respondents about several demographics (e.g., highest level of 
education completed), and checked whether these demographics affected 
participants’ responses to our central measures. Becaus  these variables did not 
significantly influence the pattern of the results they will not be discussed any 
further. 
 
Procedure and dependent variables 
For the study, we selected three environmental NGOs and three industrial 
stakeholders. After a brief introduction about CCS technology, respondents 
answered to the question whether they had ever heard of each of the organizations 
selected for the study. These were real organizations that are currently active in the 
Netherlands. Then, respondents answered questions ccerning their opinions 
about either an environmental NGO or an industrial organization, depending on the 
experimental condition they were randomly assigned to. The specific organization 
that was selected for further inquiry was randomly selected from the organizations 
that participants had acknowledged to be familiar with. As a result of this 
procedure, 143 respondents answered questions aboutone of three environmental 
NGOs and 121 respondents responded to questions about one of three industrial 
organizations. The first question assessed public trust in the organization and 
subsequent questions assessed inferred organizational motives and organizational 
competence. 
Public trust. In this study, we assessed public trust with a single question 
“To what extent do you trust the organization?”10 (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
This question parallels the item used in previous work to assess trust in risk 
regulators (Miles & Frewer, 2003). 
Inferred organizational motives. Six questions asked respondents about 
their perceptions of the reasons for the organization in question to be involved in 
CCS. For each of these six possible motives, respondents had to indicate the extent 
to which they agreed that these were likely to lead the organization to participate in 
the CCS project (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree). Principal 
components analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation on these six items revealed a 
solution with two orthogonal factors explaining 78.6% of the variance. The first 
factor comprised organization-serving motives (e.g., economic gain, organizational 
                                                
10 Instead of “the organization” in the items reported in the current report, respondents 




image) and explained 41.1% of the variance in the indiv dual items. The second 
factor captured public-serving motives (e.g., concer  for the environment, concern 
for public well-being) and explained 37.4% of the variance in the individual items 
(see Appendix at the end of this chapter for individual items and factor loadings). 
We calculated standardized factor scores and subseqently created a single 
”inferred organizational motive” score by subtracting the organization-serving 
motive score from the public-serving motive score. Scores above zero (0) on this 
variable point to the dominance of public-serving motives over organization-
serving motives; scores beneath zero (0) indicate the dominance of organization-
serving motives over public-serving motives.11 
Organizational competence. Three items assessed perceived organizational 
competence (α = .81), “The organization has a lot of knowledge about greenhouse 
gasses and technologies.”, “The organization has the ability to apply relevant 
knowledge.”, and “The organization has a lot of experience with regard to 





Analysis of variance (ANOVA) with type of organization as between-subjects 
factor and public trust as dependent variable reveal d  significant effect of type of 
organization, F(1, 262) = 19.27, p < .001, η2 = .07. Respondents reported to trust 
environmental NGOs (M = 5.02, SD = 1.41) more than industrial organizations (M 
= 4.27, SD = 1.34). This result was consistent with the hypothesis that members of 
the general public have more trust in environmental NGOs than in industrial 
organizations. 
 
                                                
11 We also assessed inferred organizational motives by means of an open-format question 
which read “Why do you think the organization participates in the carbon dioxide capture 
and storage project?”. Responses to this question were largely comparable to the concerns 
that we formulated in the six closed-format inferred organizational motives questions. The 
dominant response with regard to NGOs was that these organizations were believed to 
participate in the project out of concern for the public interest (e.g., “In order to protect the 
environment, that is, the health of the earth as well as mankind.”). The dominant response 
with regard to industrial organizations pointed at organizational interest as the reason to 
participate in the project (e.g., “It will probably benefit from it.”). Thus, we were successful 
in tapping inferred organizational motives by means of closed-format questions, which we 
preferred for use in the analyses. 
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Inferred organizational motives 
We conducted ANOVA with type of organization as independent variable and the 
inferred organizational motive score (the differenc between the two factor scores) 
as dependent variable to test the hypothesis regardin  inferred organizational 
motives. This analysis revealed a significant effect of type of organization, F(1, 
262) = 190.69, p < .001, η2 = .43. The effect indicated that members of the general 
public ascribed different motives to the two types of organizations. In fact, the 
inferred organizational motive score for both types of organizations significantly 
differed from zero, indicating that respondents thought that environmental NGOs 
acted primarily upon public-serving motives (M = 0.85, SD = 1.03), t(142) = 9.82, 
p < .001, and that industrial organizations acted prima ily upon organization-
serving motives (M = -1.01, SD = 1.12), t(120) = -9.97, p < .001. These results 
supported the hypotheses concerning inferred organizational motives.  
 
Organizational competence 
In order to exclude the possibility that differential organizational competence 
(instead of inferred motives) accounted for the effct on public trust, we performed 
an ANOVA to check whether perceived organizational competence differed for 
environmental NGOs and industrial organizations. This analysis revealed no 
significant differences, F(1, 264) = .08, ns. Environmental NGOs (M = 4.67, SD = 
0.89) and industrial organizations (M = 4.65, SD = 0.94) were considered equally 
competent with regard to the issue under consideration. Hence, differential inferred 
organizational competence cannot account for the effect on public trust that we 
found in this study. 
 
Mediation analysis 
Hypothesis 3, which stated that the difference in public trust between 
environmental NGOs and industrial organizations would be due to the nature of 
inferred motives, received support from mediation analysis. We followed the 
stepwise procedure specified by Baron and Kenny (1986) to test for mediation. 
Support for the hypothesis that respondents trusted NGOs more than the industrial 
organizations implied that the predictor affected the dependent variable (β = .26, p 
< .001). Support for the hypothesis that respondents xpected NGOs and industrial 
organizations to act upon different motives indicated hat the predictor impacted 
upon the proposed mediator (β = .65, p < .001). Another requirement for mediation 




organizational motive) and the dependent variable (i. ., public trust). We 
established that the inferred organizational motive score correlated significantly 
with the public trust measure after controlling forthe type of organization (β = .56, 
p < .001), as required. The final requirement is a significant reduction of the direct 
effect of type of organization on trust after inclusion of the proposed mediator in 
the analysis. The effect of type of organization on public trust was no longer 
significant after inclusion of the inferred organizational motive score as a mediator 
in the analysis (β = -.10, p = .15). A Sobel test (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, 
West, & Sheets, 2002; Sobel, 1982) confirmed that te reduction of the direct 
effect was significant, z = 6.86, p < .001, indicating mediation. Furthermore, we 
followed the bootstrapping procedure recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004) 
for estimating indirect effects. This procedure also supported the mediation model 
because zero (0) was not included in the 95% confide ce interval (0.18; 0.35). See 
Figure 3.1 for a schematic representation of the mediation model.12 Thus, Study 3.1 
showed that the difference in public trust between environmental NGOs and 
industrial organizations can be accounted for by inferred organizational motives. 
 
Discussion 
Study 3.1 has shown that people expect NGOs to act upon public-serving motives 
and expect industrial organizations to act upon organization-serving motives. 
Moreover, on the basis of Study 3.1 we were able to substantiate the claim that 
NGOs are generally more likely to be trusted than industrial organizations as a 
result of these inferred organizational motives. Beliefs about the competence of the 
organizations did not cause these differences in trust. As such, Study 3.1 provided 
support for all three hypotheses.  
The use of a single item to measure trust in CCS stakeholders may be 
raised as a possible limitation of this study. Single-item measures make it 
impossible to test internal consistency reliability (Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 
1997). We concur with Selnes (1998), however, that rust can be thought of as a 
unidimensional construct that is directly accessible to the respondent and, for this 
reason, it makes sense to use a single-item measure of trust.  
                                                
12 Note that both the organization-serving motive (r = -.23, p < .001) and the public-serving 
motive (r = .46, p < .001) correlated significantly with the level of trust in organizations in 
the expected direction, and that using both these variables as separate covariates in the 
analysis revealed similar results: Both covariates w re significant (p < .001), whereas the 
effect of type of organization on public trust again dropped to non-significance (p = .28) 
when these separate motive scores were included as mediators.    
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Figure 3.1 Schematic representation of inferred organizational motives mediating 




Study 3.1 is important because it provided empirical evidence that inferred 
organizational motives are an important determinant of the level of trust in 
organizations. We found support for this idea by comparing NGOs and industrial 
organizations in terms of organizational motives and public trust. This first study 
was correlational in nature, however, as it assessed naturally occurring 
motivational inferences among the general public in relation to specific existing 
organizations. Thus, even though we randomly assigned participants to rate either 
environmental NGOs or to assess industrial organizations, we relied on their 
preexisting views of these organizations. In the next two studies, we use an 
experimental approach to examine whether and how organizations can instigate 
trust through communications. 
 
Study 3.2  
 
Organizational communications 
Study 3.2 addressed the question of whether organizations that are seen to act upon 
organization-serving motives can elevate public trust by expressing (more 
positively valued) public-serving motives. Organizational communications provide 
an organization with the possibility to create a different and more positive 
impression, which may help to instigate public trust in the organization. An 
industrial organization that aims to increase public support for its actions faces a 








  β = .65* 
 
β = .26* / β = -.10 





communication dilemma, however. That is, when the industrial organization 
communicates public-serving motives (such as concern for a clean environment), 
the content of the statement is positively valued but incongruent with public 
inferences about the organizations’ motives. By contrast, when an industrial 
organization communicates that the organizational position and actions stem from 
organization-serving motives (such as economic benefits), the content of the 
statement is less positively valued but congruent with public inferences about the 
organizations’ motives. There may be a trade-off betwe n value and congruency of 
organizational motives concerning the instigation of trust. We examined this issue 
in Study 3.2.  
Despite that some motives are more highly valued than others, we expected 
that incongruence between inferred organizational motives and communicated 
motives would instigate less trust than congruence. Th  reason for this prediction 
was the idea that people do not only respond to the objective content of 
organizational communications, but also are aware that organizations may engage 
in strategic communications. That is, organizations may communicate exactly 
those motives that they expect the general public values. When arguments are 
incongruent with expectations, this may lead the general public to think that the 
motive communicated does not represent a genuine cocern of the organization. 
Indeed, research on corporate societal marketing (CSM) and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) activities has shown that while people generally appreciate 
organizations that are sensitive to the societal effects of their activities, expressing 
public-serving motives does not necessarily benefit organizational reputations. To 
be precise, expressing public-serving motives may even harm the way the 
organization is evaluated when people infer ulterior organization-serving motives 
(Ellen et al., 2000; Ellen, Webb, & Mohr, 2006; Forehand & Grier, 2003; Yoon, 
Gürhan-Canli, & Schwarz, 2006). For example, Yoon and colleagues (2006) found 
that CSR activities only improved company evaluations when people believed that 
sincere public-serving motives were the reason for companies to be involved in 
CSR activities. This reasoning aligns with prior work by Frewer and colleagues 
(Frewer, Howard, Hedderley, & Shepherd, 1996) who suggested that a priori trust 
in industry as a source of information may be relatively low “because the public 
believes the source is protecting its own interests ra her than providing good 
information out of concern for public welfare” (p. 484).  
Based on this reasoning and previous research, we exp cted people to 
perceive an industrial organization to be dishonest when it communicates an 
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environmental argument for CCS implementation because it will be seen as failing 
to acknowledge its “true” organization-serving motive. By comparison, we 
predicted communicating arguments congruent with inferred organizational 
motives to result in greater perceived honesty of the organization. In other words, a 
gas company that advocates CCS on the basis of its merits for the environment 
(i.e., expression of a public-serving motive) may be seen as dishonest and hence 
may be trusted less than when the same organization invokes an organization-
serving (e.g., economic) argument to support its poition. Thus, we hypothesized 
that – instead of the nature of the motives communicated in itself – it would be the 
congruency between organizational communications and inferred organizational 
motives that determined trust, with congruence leading to more trust than 
incongruence (Hypothesis 4). Furthermore, we hypothesized that perceived honesty 
of organizations would mediate the relationship betwe n congruency and trust 
(Hypothesis 5). We tested these predictions by means of an experimental design, 




Participants and design 
Seventy-eight undergraduate students from Leiden University participated in the 
study (20 men and 58 women). Participants were randomly allocated to one of the 
conditions of the 2 (communicated argument: environme tal argument vs. 
economic argument) by 2 (source: environmental NGOs vs. industrial 
organizations) between-subjects design. Participants each received € 3,-upon 
completion of the experiment. 
 
Procedure  
Participants arriving at the laboratory were seated in separate cubicles containing a 
personal computer to provide the instructions and questionnaires. In order to 
inform them about the topic under consideration, participants first read an 
introductory text about energy producing systems, greenhouse gasses, global 
warming and CCS technology (this text contained information derived from de 
Best-Waldhober, Daamen, and Faaij, 2006). Then, dependent upon the 
experimental condition, participants read that a group of environmental NGOs or a 
group of industrial organizations had written a report about CCS. After asking 




industry) based their opinion about CCS either on environmental concerns or on 
economic concerns (indicative of the inferred organiz tional motive), they read 
what was presented as a part of the report. This text contained either an 
environmental or an economic argument in favor of CCS implementation (see 
below). Finally, participants completed a questionnaire containing assessments of 
their trust in the organizations in question and their perceptions of organizational 
honesty. 
 
Public-serving and organization-serving arguments 
The arguments communicated were pretested in a pilot study in which participants 
(N = 30 undergraduate students from Leiden University, 9 male and 21 female) 
read the same introductory text as used in the actual st dy and then rated ten 
arguments in favor of CCS technology. These arguments also included 
environmental and economic arguments. The different arguments were presented in 
random order to rule out order effects. The objectiv  of the pilot study was to select 
arguments for the main studies that were seen as equally credible and predictable 
because differential credibility and predictability of the arguments could affect the 
level of public trust in the organizations.  
Participants rated the arguments on the statements “I consider this 
argument in favor of new CCS technology to be credibl .”, and “I consider this 
argument in favor of new CCS technology to be predictable.” (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very much). Based upon the results of repeated measures ANOVA, we selected two 
arguments for use in Study 3.2. The environmental argument selected for Study 3.2 
stated that power plants suited to capture carbon dioxide will cause less 
acidification than current power plants, which is beneficial for the environment. 
The economic argument stated that CCS implementatio w uld stimulate the 
growth of Dutch export and service provision in thefuture, which is beneficial for 
the economy. We selected these arguments because repeated measures ANOVA 
with type of argument as within-subject factor neith r revealed a significant 
difference between the two arguments with regard to credibility, F(1, 29) = 1.22, 
ns, nor with regard to predictability, F(1, 29) = 1.28, ns. Hence, the pilot study 
showed that participants perceived these environmental a d economic arguments 








Source manipulation check. One question served to assess the adequacy of the 
manipulation of the source of communication. The item asked “Which group of 
organizations has written the report?”. Participants had to choose one of three 
alternatives, 1) a group of environmental NGOs, 2) a group of industrial 
organizations, or 3) another group of organizations. 
Inferred organizational motives. Two questions, posed prior to the 
manipulation of the argument, assessed inferred organizational motives: “To what 
extent do you expect the position of the group of organizations to result from 
environmental considerations?” and “To what extent do you expect the position of 
the group of organizations to result from economic considerations?” (1 = not at all, 
7 = very much). These questions allowed us to determine congruency between the 
argument communicated and the inferred motive of the source.  
Trust. Trust was assessed with three items (α = .84), “To what extent do 
you trust the group of organizations?”, “To what extent does the argument that the
group of organizations provides inspires trust?”, and “To what extent do you 
consider the group of organizations to be trustworthy?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much). 
Perceived honesty. Perceived honesty was assessed with three items (α = 
.85), “To what extent do you consider the group of organizations to be honest?”, 
“To what extent do you think that the group of organizations peaks the truth?” and 
“To what extent do you think that the group of organizations has a hidden 
agenda?” (reverse coded; 1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
 
Results 
Source manipulation check 
All seventy-eight participants responded to the check of the source manipulation 
correctly. Participants in the NGOs condition answered that a group of 
environmental NGOs had written the report. Participants in the industry condition 
answered that a group of industrial organizations had written the report.  
 
Inferred organizational motives  
We conducted an ANOVA with type of organization as between-subjects variable 
and inferred environmental concern as dependent variable. This analysis revealed a 
significant effect for type of organization, F(1, 75) = 87.80, p < .001, η2 = .54. 




SD = 1.21) more than industrial organizations (M = 2.95, SD = 1.45) to base their 
position about CCS on environmental concerns. A similar analysis performed on 
economic concern revealed a significant effect for type of organization as well, 
F(1, 75) = 119.03, p < .001, η2 = .61. Participants expected industrial organizations 
(M = 6.13, SD = 0.99) more than environmental NGOs (M = 2.90, SD = 1.55) to 
base their position about CCS on economic concerns. Thus, we successfully 
created conditions in which the provision of an environmental argument was 
consistent with the inference of environmental concer s associated with the public-
serving motive (in the case of NGOs) and in which the provision of an economic 
argument was consistent with the inference of economic concerns associated with 
the organization-serving motive (in the case of industrial organizations). 
 
Trust 
Hypothesis 4 stated that congruence between type of organization and type of 
communicated argument would lead to higher levels of trust in the organizations 
than incongruence We conducted an ANOVA with type of organization and type of 
communicated argument as between-subject factors and trust as the dependent 
variable to test this prediction. The analysis revealed no main effects for type of 
organization and type of communicated argument, only the interaction predicted, 
F(1, 74) = 3.81, p = .055, η2 = .05. Planned contrasts between the congruent 
conditions (1) and the incongruent conditions (-1) showed that the mean level of 
trust in the congruent conditions differed from thelevel of trust in the incongruent 
conditions, F(1, 76) = 3.90, p = .052. Consistent with the hypothesis, participant 
had more trust in organizations in the congruent coditions (M = 4.12, SD = 1.24) 




We performed an ANOVA with type of organization and type of communicated 
argument as between-subject factors and perceived honesty as dependent variable, 
which revealed a main effect for type of organization, F(1, 74) = 10.94, p = .001, 
η
2 = .13, qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 74) = 7.44, p < .01, η2 = .09. 
Planned contrasts between the congruent conditions (1) and the incongruent 
conditions (-1) showed that the mean level of perceived honesty in the congruent 
conditions differed from the level of perceived honesty in the incongruent 
conditions, F(1, 76) = 6.28, p < .02. Perceived honesty was higher in the congruent 
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Figure 3.2 Trust in environmental NGOs and industrial organiztions as a function 













Mediation analysis  
Hypothesis 5 stated that perceived honesty would meiate the relationship between 
congruency and trust in organizations. To test for mediation, we again followed the 
procedure recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). As noted above, we already 
found the required congruency effect on the dependent variable, trust (β = .22). We 
also found the congruency effect on the proposed meiator, perceived honesty (β = 
.28). The third requirement for mediation is a signif cant correlation between the 
proposed mediator (perceived honesty) and the depennt variable (trust) after 
controlling for congruency, which we found (β = .79, p < .001).13 Finally, we found 
that the effect of congruency on trust dropped to nonsignificance after inclusion of 
the proposed mediator (perceived honesty) in the equation (β = .00, ns). The 
decrease of this effect was significant (Sobel z = 2.44, p < .02), indicating 
                                                
13 There is good theoretical reason to assume that honesty and trust are highly correlated but 
different concepts. We used structural equation modeling to test whether the two-factor 
model (trust and honesty as separate factors) fitted th  data better than the single-factor 
model. The two-factor model fitted the data better (χ2 (8) = 11.03; NNFI = .98; CFI = .99; 
RMSEA = .07) than the single-factor model (χ2 (9) = 22.02; NNFI = .93; CFI = .96; 
RMSEA = .14). This difference was significant, ∆χ2 = 10.99, p < .001, indicating support 



















mediation. Again, we applied the bootstrapping method recommended by Preacher 
and Hayes (2004) for estimating indirect effects. Because zero (0) was not included 
in the 95% confidence interval (0.06; 0.51), this procedure also supported the 
mediation model represented in Figure 3.3. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Schematic representation of perceived honesty mediating the effect of 





Study 3.2 has shown that CCS organizations that are believed to act upon 
organization-serving motives (industrial organizations) cannot build trust by simply 
communicating that their position is based on more positively valued public-
serving motives. The central prediction in this study was that the degree of 
congruence between inferred organizational motives and organizational 
communications would determine perceived honesty of the organizations in 
question and, in turn, would affect trust in these organizations. Results offered 
support for this reasoning, indicating that incongruence between organizational 
communications and inferred organizational motives induces less trust than 
congruence. As such, Study 3.2 complements previous research that showed that 
people sometimes negatively evaluate firms that are involved in CSR activities, 
despite the public-serving character of these activities (e.g., Forehand & Grier, 
2003; Yoon et al., 2006). That is, our results suggest that members of the public 







  β = .28* 
 
β = .22, p = .052 / β = .00, ns 
*p < . 05, **p < .001    Sobel z = 2.44, p < .05 
 
Organizational motives and communications 
 
63 
may easily suspect firms involved in such activities to pursue some organization-




In Study 3.3, we examined whether organizations that are believed to act upon 
organization-serving motives can preserve public trust by expressing a combination 
of public-serving motives and organization-serving motives. This study extends 
Study 3.2 in which has been shown that organizations that are perceived to act 
upon organization-serving motives cannot simply elevat  public trust by 
communicating public-serving motives in support of heir positions. That is, Study 
3.3 focuses on whether organizations can raise trust by expressing public-serving 
motives in addition to conveying their “true” organization-serving motives (which 
is considered diagnostic of the true reason for the organizational position). 
Based on findings in Study 3.2 one might expect people to mistrust an 
industrial organization that communicates an enviromental argument, regardless 
of whether the incongruent argument is accompanied by a seemingly more truthful 
organization-serving argument. After all, communicating such a public-serving 
argument is incongruent with inferred organizational motives. Nevertheless, we 
predicted that an industrial organization would elicit more trust by communicating 
a public-serving (environmental) argument in combination with an organization-
serving (economic) argument, as the latter is likely to be seen as revealing true 
organizational motives. This prediction is consistent with the idea that perceptions 
of honesty mediate the effect of communication on trust (as shown in Study 3.2) 
because expressing economic concerns (that industrial organizations are expected 
to have) decreases the possibility that people willquestion the truthfulness of 
communicated motives. This reasoning is also consistent with previous findings by 
Ellen and colleagues (2006) showing that profit organizations engaging in CSR 
activities are rated more positively when consumers perceive both public-serving 
and organization-serving motives for engagement in these activities compared to 
when consumers perceive only public-serving motives.  
The aim of Study 3.3 was twofold. First, we aimed to replicate the finding 
of Study 3.2 that congruency impacts upon perceived honesty and, consequently, 
affects organizational trust. Second, we aimed to examine whether the negative 
effects of an incongruent argument on organizational trust can be attenuated when 




organizational motives. Again, we hypothesized thatindustrial organizations would 
instigate more trust when they communicate arguments that are congruent rather 
than incongruent with inferred motives (Hypothesis 6a). Additionally, we 
hypothesized that a combination of congruent and incongruent arguments would 
instigate more trust than the provision of an incongruent argument by itself 
(Hypothesis 6b).  
 
Method 
Participants and design 
Fifty-one undergraduate students from Leiden University participated in the study 
(17 men and 34 women). Participants were randomly allocated to one of three 
conditions (communicated arguments: environmental argument vs. economic 
argument vs. mixed) between-subjects design. Upon completion of the experiment 
participants each received € 3,-. 
 
Procedure and dependent variables  
Study 3.3 largely followed the procedure used in Study 3.2, except that Study 3.3 
focused on industrial organizations only (instead of comparing these to NGOs) and 
included an experimental condition in which both ane vironmental and an 
economic argument were provided. To ensure that equal amounts of information 
about the organization were available in all three experimental conditions, in Study 
3.3 we also provided two arguments in the two single-motive conditions (whereas 
one argument was provided for each experimental conditi  in Study 3.2). Thus, 
participants received two public-serving (environmetal) arguments, two 
organization-serving (economic) arguments, or one public-serving (environmental) 
and one organization-serving (economic) argument.  
With these differences included, the procedure was as follows. First, 
participants received the introductory text about energy producing systems, 
greenhouse gasses, global warming and CCS technology. Then, participants read 
that a group of industrial organizations had written a report about CCS and 
received what was presented as a part of the report. Dependent upon experimental 
condition, this text either contained two environmetal arguments, two economic 
arguments, or an environmental argument and an economic argument in favor of 
CCS implementation. Finally, participants completed the questionnaire (which was 
the same as in Study 3.2) containing measures of trust in the industrial 
organizations (α = .73), perceived honesty of these organizations (α = .70) and the 
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manipulation check, which consisted of the item “What type(s) of arguments in 
favor of CCS were in the report that was written by the group of industrial 
organizations?” (1 = two environmental arguments, 2 = two economic arguments, 3 




All participants answered to the check of the manipulation as intended. Participants 
in the public-serving arguments condition answered that environmental arguments 
were provided in the report written by the industrial organizations, participants in 
the organization-serving arguments condition answered that economic arguments 
were provided in the report, and participants in the mixed arguments condition 
answered that one environmental argument and one economical argument were 
provided in the report. 
 
Trust   
We conducted an ANOVA with type of argument as betwe n-subject factor and 
trust as dependent variable to test whether the typ of argument influenced people’s 
trust in the organizations. This analysis revealed a significant effect, F(1, 48) = 
7.88, p = .001, η2 = .25. Replicating the results of Study 3.2 and in support of 
Hypothesis 6a, contrast analysis revealed a significa t difference in trust in the 
organizations, depending on whether organizations provided economic arguments 
(M = 3.84; SD = 1.12) or environmental arguments (M = 2.84, SD = 0.96), p < .01. 
In correspondence with Hypothesis 6b, this analysis also revealed that a mixed 
communication, including both types of arguments, in tigated significantly more 
trust (M = 4.10, SD = 0.82) than the communication of environmental arguments 
alone, p < .001. Moreover, communication instigated trust equally in the 
organizations in the mixed-arguments condition and the economic arguments 
condition, p = .45. Thus, complementing Study 3.2, we obtained support for the 
prediction that incongruence between communicated arguments and inferred 
organizational motives instigates less trust than iference-congruent 
communications. The results of this study additionally indicate that when a 
positively valued but incongruent (public-serving) argument is provided together 
with more negatively valued but congruent (organization-serving) argument, 






We conducted ANOVA with type of argument as between-subject factor and 
perceived honesty as dependent variable to test whether the type of argument that 
was communicated influenced perceived honesty. This analysis revealed a 
significant effect, F(1, 48) = 13.56, p < .001, η2 = .36. In line with Study 3.2, 
contrast analysis revealed a significant difference i  perceived honesty, depending 
on whether organizations provided economic arguments (M = 4.29, SD = 0.83) or 
environmental arguments (M = 2.92, SD = 0.78), p < .001. This analysis also 
revealed that participants reported higher perceived honesty after mixed 
communication (M = 4.00, SD = 0.82) than after communication of public-serving 
(i.e., environmental) arguments alone, p < .001. Moreover, perceived honesty did 
not differ between the mixed-arguments condition and the condition in which, in 
line with inferred motives, organization-serving (i.e., economic) arguments were 
communicated, p = .30.  
 
Mediation analysis 
Again, we tested whether perceived honesty mediated th  relationship between 
communications of and trust in organizations (Hypothesis 5). A Sobel test is not 
possible with all three levels of the predictor variable included in the analysis, 
however. Therefore, we used the most relevant contrast as the predictor variable in 
the analysis: The provision of arguments incongruent with inferred organizational 
motives (-2) versus the provision of mixed arguments (1) and the provision of 
arguments congruent with inferred organizational motives (1). This procedure 
allowed us to assess whether the magnitude of the direct effect of communications 
on trust was significantly reduced after introduction of perceived honesty (the 
proposed mediator) in the equation. We found the requi d effect on the outcome 
variable (i.e., trust; β = .49, p < .001) and on the proposed mediator (i.e., perceived 
honesty; β = .59, p < .001). Third, there was a significant positive correlation 
between the proposed mediator and the outcome variable after controlling for the 
predictor variable (β = .39, p < .01). The final requirement for mediation is a 
significant reduction of the effect of the predictor variable on the outcome variable 
after introduction of the proposed mediator in the equation. The effect of 
organizational communications on trust in organizations remained marginally 
significant after including perceived honesty as a covariate in the analysis (β = .26, 
p = .08). Nevertheless, the reduction of this direct effect was significant (Sobel z = 
2.40, p < .02), indicating (partial) mediation. Again, the 95% confidence interval   
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(-0.38; -0.01) obtained by bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) did not include 
zero (0) and therefore supports the mediation model represented in Figure 3.4. 
Thus, Study 3.3 replicated and extended the findings obtained in Study 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Schematic representation of perceived honesty mediating the effect of 






Recently developed CCS technology, which involves the capture of carbon dioxide 
in industrial processes and the subsequent storage in underground sites such as 
depleted gas fields, is an important strategy to mitigate climate change. Public 
acceptance is important for successful implementation of this technology. Trust in 
organizations responsible for the development and use of modern technologies 
such as CCS is considered an important determinant of public acceptance of such 
technologies (Siegrist, 2000). That is, when people trust CCS stakeholders, they 
will be more willing to accept this technology as a climate change mitigation 
option than when people mistrust the organizations in question. This work 
considered the impact of inferred organizational motives and organizational 
communications on trust in CCS stakeholders. 
The current research, which consisted of a field study and two 
experimental studies, indicates that inferred organizational motives play an 
important role with regard to public trust in organizations. Study 3.1 showed that 







  β = .59** 
 
β = .49** / β = .26, p = .08 





people expected industrial organizations to act prima ily upon organization-serving 
motives, which was negatively related to trust, whereas people expected 
environmental NGOs to act more upon public-serving motives, which was 
positively related to trust. Indeed, inferred motives accounted for the difference in 
trust accorded to industrial organizations and enviro mental NGOs. These findings 
led us to conclude that inferred organizational motives are an important 
determinant of public trust in organizations.  
Study 3.2 and Study 3.3 further indicate that it is he level of congruency 
with inferred organizational motives rather than the specific content of 
communications that determines whether or not organizational communications 
instigate public trust in organizations. Study 3.2 showed that NGOs communicating 
an environmental argument and industrial organizations communicating an 
economic argument (i.e., congruent with inferred motives) were judged as more 
honest than NGOs communicating economic considerations and industrial 
organizations communicating environmental considerations (i.e., incongruent with 
inferred motives). This difference in perceived honesty, in turn, caused differential 
trust in these organizations involved in CCS. Thus, an industrial organization may 
attempt to improve its image by communicating a pro-environmental argument, but 
this communication strategy may backfire in that it is likely to reduce rather than 
increase trust in the organization. Study 3.3 extended the results of Study 3.2 by 
showing that trust in organizations could be preserved when the provision of an 
argument incongruent with inferred organizational motives was accompanied by a 
seemingly more truthful argument congruent with inferred organizational motives.  
The current research contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, 
it provides empirical evidence that people’s ideas about why organizations act like 
they do influence the extent to which they trust these organizations. Specifically, 
we have shown that differences in trust between industrial organizations and 
environmental NGOs can be accounted for by inferred organizational motives. 
Previous research on acceptance of policies related to climate change linked policy 
endorsement to organizational motives (in terms of internal versus external 
organizational goals; Nilsson et al., 2004). Consistent with the current research, 
this previous work showed that different organizational motives were attributed to 
public-sector organizations than to private-sector organizations. Whereas Nilsson 
and colleagues (2004) considered the views of decision makers working at these 
organizations, our research considered the views of members of the general public. 
Moreover, previous consumer research on inferred organizational motives 
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predominantly focused on perceptions of either nonpr fit organizations or profit 
organizations (e.g., Forehand & Grier, 2003; Yoon et al., 2006; Ellen et al., 2006), 
without trying to explain potential differences betw en these organizations in terms 
of organizational motives and evaluations of organiz tions. The current research 
provided empirical evidence that trust in organizations differs as a function of 
inferred organizational motives (at least in the context of CCS).  
Another important addition to existing literature is that trust can be 
preserved by communicating public-serving motives in combination with 
seemingly more truthful organization-serving motives. Previous consumer research 
showed that expressions of public-serving motives by companies (i.e., through 
their stated engagement in CSR programs) may fail to improve company 
evaluations when people doubt the genuineness of the positive intent (Forehand & 
Grier, 2003; Yoon et al., 2006). In a similar vein, our research revealed that 
industrial organizations that communicate public-serving motives are considered 
less honest and consequently instigate less trust than industrial organizations 
communicating organization-serving motives, even though the latter type of 
motives are generally valued less. Important is that we additionally showed that 
trust in organizations can be preserved by communicati g public-serving motives 
in combination with acknowledging “true” organization-serving motives.  
We used a combination of field survey data and experimental data to test 
our ideas. Study 3.1 used an internet survey among members of the general public 
to examine the relationship between motive inferences and public trust in 
organizations. This method of examination suits theobjective of determining 
whether such a relationship exists in real life, but relies on correlational data. In 
Study 3.2 and Study 3.3, we used an experimental design to be able to draw firmer 
conclusions about causality in the relationship betwe n communicated and inferred 
motives on the one hand and public trust in organizations on the other. In these 
studies, however, we asked a more homogeneous student sample to respond to our 
manipulations and measures, which raises questions about whether these results 
generalize to other populations. Results from these different studies and 
methodologies showed convergent support for our central prediction that inferred 
motives influence public trust. This consistency in results between the different 
studies and methodologies increases our confidence i  the robustness of our 
findings. Moreover, the similarities between the inferred motives in the field study 
and in the experimental studies suggest that our results obtained with student 




One could question whether our results can be generaliz d to organizations 
in general or whether they are limited to the specific organizations we used in our 
research. We think our results are not limited to the specific NGOs and industrial 
organizations in our studies. In Study 3.1, respondents were randomly assigned to 
answer questions about a specific organization, either one of three existing 
environmental NGOs or one of three real industrial organizations. In Study 3.2, 
participants were either asked about a group of unspecified environmental NGOs 
or about a group of unspecified industrial organizations. Thus, even though we 
asked participants to consider existing industrial or environmental organizations 
they were familiar with, we did not rely on their knowledge about a specific 
organization, as different participants were asked about different organizations (in 
Study 3.1) or considered a group of organizations at the same time (in Study 3.2 
and Study 3.3). Therefore, we think the results of the current research should apply 
more broadly to different types of organizations (e.g., industrial organizations, 
environmental NGOs) and are not limited to some specific organization (e.g., 
Shell) participants thought about. 
The current research raises interesting questions for further theory 
development as well as future applications. For insta ce, knowledge of the current 
research may be applied in the context of communications about CCS in order to 
avoid the problems that arose with regard to public support for the disposal of the 
decommissioned oil storage and loading structure Brent Spar in 1995 (Löfstedt & 
Renn, 1997). In the Brent Spar case, industrial organization Shell UK 
communicated that environmental risks of the deep-sea disposal of the Brent Spar 
were negligible and, as such, should be preferred over nshore disposal of the 
Brent Spar. There was considerable pressure from NGO Greenpeace, however, 
which portrayed deep-sea disposal as a cheap option compared to onshore disposal 
of the structure, emphasizing Shell’s organizational i terest in pursuing this option. 
As a result, Shell’s position was not accepted by the general public, although deep-
sea disposal probably was a better option than onshore disposal. On the basis of the 
current research, we would argue that people had more likely accepted Shell’s 
position to a greater extent when Shell had also truthfully communicated its 
economic interest in deep-sea disposal of the Brent Spar. Thus, we think that the 
issues addressed in this research and the results obtained are relevant 
considerations in the context of other environmental issues as well. Nevertheless, 
CCS organizations should be aware of the processes identified in this research 
when they inform members of the general public about CCS.    
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Moreover, now that we have established that inferred motives determine 
the likelihood that a communicated concern with thepublic interest is seen as 
honest and trustworthy, it would seem important to assess whether there is a way 
for organizations to influence spontaneous motive inf rences made by the general 
public, or to redress inappropriate expectations. Organizations trying to influence 
public trust through communication run the risk that their communications may be 
perceived as superficial and insincere. Organizations trying to influence public 
trust via concrete action displays may be more effectiv  in increasing 
organizational trust. For instance, organizations may decide to donate money to 
plant trees in order to compensate for carbon dioxie emissions that result from 
business trips. By actually investing in pro-environmental measures, perhaps 
organizations can more effectively override inferences about organization-serving 
motives of organizations, and hence increase public trust. On the other hand, even 
in the case of concrete pro-environmental actions, people may believe that 
organizations engage in these initiatives for the mre reason of improving the 
organizational image. Future research is needed to examine whether (and under 
which conditions) it is indeed possible to induce gr ater trust in organizations by 
engaging in pro-environmental activities. 
We conclude that people neither automatically reject organizations that act 
upon organization-serving motives, nor do they automatically trust those 
organizations that they perceive as acting out of public-serving motives. Whereas 
motive inferences guide judgments of trust in CCS stakeholders, greater trust is 
instigated when organizational communications are congruent (rather than 
incongruent) with inferred organizational motives. This congruency effect holds 
true for environmental NGOs and industrial organizations involved in CCS. As 
such, the industrial profit organization in the outset of this article may 
communicate that CCS implementation is beneficial for the environment, but it 
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olitical decision makers often have to propose new policies and make 
decisions on issues that are too complex to judge for members of the 
general public. These days, one of the most important issues on the political 
agenda concerns policymaking related to the prevention of climate change. The 
implementation of recently developed carbon dioxide capture and storage 
technology (CCS), in addition to saving on energy consumption and increasing use 
of sustainable energy, is currently considered as an important strategy to mitigate 
climate change. If political decision makers make decisions about CCS, then it is 
critical that members of the general public approve f this decision. After all, 
public opposition to decisions can result in severe protest behavior and decisions 
being reversed (see, for example, the 1995 case of Brent Spar; Löfstedt & Renn, 
1997). As such, it is important to understand how people come to accept or oppose 
such policy decisions. 
In the current research, we focus on how public acceptance of policy 
decisions is affected by whether or not interest groups receive an opportunity to 
express their opinions in the decision-making process. Such an opportunity to 
express opinions in decision-making processes is commonly referred to as “voice” 
(cf. Folger, 1977) and represents an important elemnt of procedural justice in 
individual-level decision-making processes as well as national-level policymaking 
(Lind & Tyler, 1988). The large majority of research in the procedural justice 
domain has focused on personal voice in decision making (i.e., the opportunity for
individuals to state their opinion about the preferred outcome distribution). This 
research, for instance, has shown that personal voice affects procedural fairness 
judgments (e.g., Bies & Shapiro, 1988; Folger, 1977; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & 
Wilke, 1996), as well as satisfaction with and acceptance of decision-making 
outcomes (e.g., Peterson, 1999; Ståhl, Van Prooijen, & Vermunt, 2004; Van den 
Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998). Such personal-voice effects have often been explained 
in terms of self-oriented instrumental and relational concerns, referring to the 
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conviction that personal voice can modify the outcome distribution (instrumental) 
or conveys how the decision maker values and respects the parties involved 
(relational; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind 1992). 
We aim to expand current insights on voice in decision making from the 
individual level to the group level. That is, in the current research we examine how 
voice for interest groups involved in national-level policymaking impacts on 
evaluations of decision makers and acceptance of the decisions made. We refer to 
opportunities for interest groups to express their opinions in decision-making 
processes as “group voice”. We propose that people car about group voice in 
decision-making processes, but for different reasons than why they care about 
personal voice in decision making. Specifically, we propose that people care about 
group voice because they use this procedural characteristic to indicate the 
trustworthiness of decision makers. In turn, we propose that inferred 
trustworthiness determines whether people tend to accept or oppose the policy 
decisions made. Finally, we propose that people’s knowledge level about an issue 
can influence their preferences for specific decision-making procedures as well as 
their willingness to accept resulting decisions. Weexamine these predictions in the 
context of decision making about CCS. 
 
Voice in decision making 
Procedural justice research has demonstrated that people consider voice an 
important aspect of decision-making processes. Why people care about voice in 
decision making is often explained in terms of instrumental and relational reasons 
(see Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). From an instrumental perspective, 
an individual values voice in decision-making processes because expressing one’s 
views on an issue may persuade the decision-making authority to provide this 
person with more favorable outcomes. Early research on dispute resolution by 
means of third-party interventions has illustrated this point by showing that 
people’s satisfaction with procedures and outcomes depends on the extent to which 
procedures provide people with an opportunity to present all relevant information 
to the decision maker (e.g., LaTour, 1978, Walker, LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut, 
1974). From a relational perspective, an individual values voice in decision making 
because voice indicates the quality of treatment by decision makers, which conveys 
important self-relevant information, including information about whether the 
decision maker values and respects the individual in question (e.g., Smith, Tyler, 
Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992).  
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Research by Lind and colleagues (Lind, Kanfer, & Early, 1990) has shown 
that voice effects indeed can involve both instrumental and relational concerns. 
Participants in this study were allowed to voice thir opinion either before or after 
the authority made the decision, or they were not all wed to voice their opinion at 
all. Fairness judgments were highest in the case of predecision-voice procedures 
(satisfying instrumental and relational concerns), second highest in the case of 
postdecision-voice procedures (satisfying relational concern only), and lowest in 
the case of no-voice procedures (satisfying neither instrumental nor relational 
concerns). Accordingly, both instrumental and relational concerns may be used to 
explain why people respond more positively to personal-voice procedures than to 
no-voice procedures. 
Thus far, however, studies on voice have almost exclusively focused on 
personal voice in decision-making processes. Some notable exceptions are early 
studies on dispute resolution by means of third-party interventions, in which 
perceptions about procedural fairness were assessed among people observing the 
dispute-resolution process (LaTour 1978; Walker et al., 1974). In addition, more 
recent studies have focused on how people respond to situations in which another 
individual is denied (unfair treatment) an opportunity to voice (De Cremer & Van 
Hiel, 2006; Kray & Lind, 2002; Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998; Van den Bos & 
Lind, 2001). While the strength of the impact of injustice experienced by others on 
people’s own judgments and emotions differed across studies, they all seem to 
indicate that people are to some extent sensitive to the unfairness experienced by 
others. The results of these studies are interesting, considering that self-oriented 
implications of unfair treatment by authorities (i.e., instrumental and relational 
concerns) are less clear for people who do not personally experience the unfair 
treatment than for people who do experience this unfairness personally (Lind et al., 
1998). 
National policy decisions are often made without the direct participation of 
individual members of the general public in the decision-making process. 
Nevertheless, the decisions made do affect them and he ce their acceptance of 
these decisions is important. Interest groups (representing the general public) may 
be directly involved and consulted in the decision-making process, however. For 
example, individual citizens have no personal involvement in the decision-making 
process regarding CCS implementation, but different interest groups, including 
environmental NGOs and industrial organizations, are involved in CCS decision 




oriented instrumental and relational concerns to natio l policymaking, one would 
predict only modest group-voice effects. After all, when a person is not directly 
involved in decision making, decision-making procedures do not convey 
information relevant to this person’s relational stnding (i.e., whether this person is 
valued and respected by the decision maker). Moreover, without personal 
involvement in decision making people do not have the opportunity to exert control 
over the decision-making process and/or outcome (i.e., nstrumental concern), 
regardless of the decision-making procedure used. Indeed, recent research suggests 
that this is one of the reasons why responses to political decision making cannot be 
fully predicted from existing research on the effects of procedural justice in 
interpersonal decision making (Leung, Tong, & Lind, 2007). As a result, a focus on 
self-oriented concerns cannot directly explain why people would value group-voice 
procedures over no-voice procedures in national policymaking. 
We anticipate group-voice effects in national policymaking to relate to the 
implications for the decision maker at the group leve  (i.e., “The decision maker 
uses this procedure; what does that say about the decision maker?”), instead of the 
self-relevant implications of procedures that occur at the personal level (i.e., “The 
decision maker uses this procedure; what does this imply for me?”). Because 
members of the general public often have insufficient expertise to personally judge 
the merits of proposed national-level policies on their own, trustworthiness is 
among the most important characteristics of policymakers. In support of this 
thought, research on trust in hazard managers (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000) has 
indicated that the level of trust in authorities that manage complex technologies 
influences public perceptions about the risks and benefits associated with these 
technologies. These findings are important because perceptions of risks and 
benefits have been found to influence public acceptance of complex technologies 
(Siegrist, 1999, 2000). In that sense, people are lik ly to use their trust in 
policymakers as a guide to decide whether to accept or reject policies on complex 
issues such as CCS. The perceived trustworthiness of the decision maker is likely 
to be determined by information about group voice in the decision-making process.  
We carried out three experiments to test 1) whether group voice (i.e., an 
opportunity for certain interest groups to voice their opinions in the decision-
making process) impacts public inferences regarding the trustworthiness of the 
political decision maker, and 2) whether inferred trus worthiness in turn influences 
people’s acceptance of the decision made. We have designed these experiments in 
the context of decision making about the implementation of recently developed 
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CCS technology, which is an issue on the current poli ical agenda. Several interest 
groups are involved in the issue, including environme tal NGOs and industrial 
organizations. The central prediction in our studies is that people determine the 
trustworthiness of decision makers on the basis of whether or not decision makers 
provide interest groups an opportunity to voice their opinion in the decision-
making process and, subsequently, that they decide to accept or oppose decisions 




In Study 4.1, we examined whether public acceptance of political decisions is 
affected by the way political authorities treat interest groups. Participants observed 
whether or not a political authority allowed environmental NGOs and industrial 
organizations an opportunity to voice their opinion n the decision-making process. 
Subsequently, participants indicated their support f r the decision made by the 
political authority. We hypothesized that participants would consider the political 
authority to be more trustworthy when a group-voice procedure was used (i.e., 
allowing input from interest groups) compared to a no-voice procedure (i.e., 
unilateral decision making) to arrive at the decision (Hypothesis 1). We further 
hypothesized that participants would more readily accept decision made on the 
basis of a group-voice procedure compared to a no-voice procedure (Hypothesis 2). 
Finally, we hypothesized that the proposed relationship between the decision-
making procedure and acceptance of decisions made would be mediated by 




Participants and design 
Forty undergraduate students from Leiden University participated in the study (33 
women and 7 men). We randomly allocated each of them to one of the four 
conditions of the 2 (procedure: group voice vs. no voice) by 2 (advice regarding 
CCS implementation: pro vs. con) between-subjects experimental design. Upon 
completion of the experiment they were each paid 3 euros (approximately U.S.$4) 







Upon arrival at the laboratory participants were led into separate cubicles, each 
equipped with a personal computer. On the computer screen they read an 
introductory text about energy production, greenhouse gasses and global warming, 
and the new CCS technology. This text contained factual information only. After 
reading the text, participants indicated the extent o which they considered CCS 
implementation to be a good idea. Next, they read that multiple parties were 
involved in CCS and that a so-called “CCS board” had been assigned to advise the 
national government about whether or not CCS should be implemented. Then, 
participants read that the CCS board had provided both environmental NGOs and 
industrial organizations with an opportunity to voice their opinion about CCS 
implementation (group-voice condition) or that the CCS board had not provided 
environmental NGOs and industrial organizations with such an opportunity (no-
voice condition). Subsequently, participants completed a questionnaire that asked 
them about the trustworthiness of the CCS board and the fairness of the decision-
making procedure employed by the CCS board (this measur  was included as a 
manipulation check for the procedure manipulation). After filling out the 
questionnaire, participants either read that the CCS board had given an advice for 
(pro condition) or against (con condition) implementation of CCS. Then, 
participants completed a second questionnaire assessing their acceptance of this 
advice and further containing the controls of the manipulations. Finally, 
participants were debriefed, paid and thanked for their participation.  
 
Dependent variables  
Manipulation checks. To check whether the procedure manipulation affected 
procedural fairness judgments as intended, we assessed these judgments by means 
of two questions at the end of the first questionnaire. The questions read “To what 
extent do you consider the decision-making procedur to be fair?” and “To what 
extent do you think the CCS board handled this decision fairly?” (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very much), r = .66. In addition, we checked participants’ perceptions of the 
decision-making procedure by means of two questions at the end of the study. 
These questions read “Did environmental NGOs have an opportunity to express 
their opinion about CCS technology?” and “Did industrial organizations have an 
opportunity to express their opinion about CCS technology?” (1 = yes, 2 = no). We 
also checked participants’ awareness of the content of the decision made by the 
authority at the end of the questionnaire. This check consisted of the question “Was 
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the advice of the CCS board for or against implementation of CCS?” (1 = for 
implementation, 2 = against implementation). 
Trustworthiness. Before participants were informed about the decision 
made, inferred trustworthiness of the CCS board was assessed with two questions, 
“To what extent do you trust the CCS board?” and “To what extent do you 
consider the CCS board to be trustworthy?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much), r = .74. 
Acceptance. Acceptance of the advice of the CCS board was measur d 
with two questions, “To what extent do you intend to respect the advice of the CCS 
board?” and “To what extent do you accept the advice of the CCS board?” (1 = not 




In order to check whether the procedure manipulation had an effect on procedural 
fairness judgments (which we assessed prior to the manipulation of advice), we 
conducted analysis of variance (ANOVA) with procedure (group voice vs. no 
voice) as independent variable and procedural fairness judgments as dependent 
variable. As intended, participants judged the group-voice procedure to be fairer 
(M = 5.26, SD = 0.97) than the no-voice procedure (M = 3.61, SD = 1.56), F(1, 38) 
= 16.62, p < .001, η2 = .30. Moreover, participants answered to the questions 
intended to check their awareness of the procedure manipulation as expected. 
Participants in the group-voice condition indicated hat both NGOs and industrial 
organizations received an opportunity to voice, whereas participants in the no-
voice condition indicated that NGOs and industrial organizations did not receive 
voice in the decision-making process. With regard to the advice manipulation, 
participants in the pro-advice condition indicated that the CCS board gave an 
advice for CCS implementation, whereas participants i  the con-advice condition 
indicated that the board gave an advice against CCSimplementation. Thus, the 
manipulations were perceived as intended. 
 
Trustworthiness 
Inferred trustworthiness of the CCS board was assessed prior to the advice 
provided and therefore analyzed as a function of decision-making procedure only. 
We performed an ANOVA with procedure (group voice vs. no voice) as 
independent variable and inferred trustworthiness of the CCS board as dependent 




accordance with Hypothesis 1, participants judged the CCS board to be more 
trustworthy after it employed a group-voice procedur  (M = 4.71, SD = 0.99) 
relative to a no-voice procedure (M = 3.82, SD = 1.25).  
 
Acceptance 
We conducted an ANOVA with procedure (group voice vs. no voice) and advice 
(pro vs. con) as independent variables and acceptance of the advice of the CCS 
board as dependent variable. This analysis revealed a main effect of procedure 
only, F(1, 36) = 6.66, p < .02, η2 = .16. In line with Hypothesis 2, participants more 
readily accepted the advice of the CCS board when t interest groups had been 
provided with an opportunity to voice their opinions about CCS (M = 5.62, SD = 
0.96) than when these had not been provided with suc an opportunity (M = 4.61, 
SD = 1.45). Neither an effect of the advice given noran interaction was observed, 
indicating that the effect of group voice was obtained regardless of the nature of the 
advice given by the CCS board.  
In addition, we were able to rule out that participants’ own preferences 
regarding CCS implementation affected these results. That is, we checked whether 
inclusion of participants’ attitudes towards CCS (assessed directly after they read 
the text about CCS) as a covariate in the analysis changed the pattern of results on 
acceptance of the advice. This was not the case, thus participants’ outcome 
preferences did not affect the impact of group voice and advice on acceptance. This 
finding corroborates the reasoning that decision acceptance depends on 
characteristics of the decision-making procedure, rather than on whether the 
decision matches one’s own decision preference.15 
 
Mediation analysis 
Following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure to test for mediation, we 
performed a series of regressions to examine whether trustworthiness of the CCS 
board mediated the effect of decision-making procedur  on acceptance of the 
advice. The effect of the predictor (i.e., procedur) on the outcome variable (i.e., 
acceptance of the advice) was significant (β = .39, p < .02), as was the effect of the 
predictor on the proposed mediator (i.e., trustworthiness of the CCS board; β = .38, 
p < .02). We also observed the required significant ssociation between the 
proposed mediator (i.e., trustworthiness of the CCS board) and the outcome 
variable (i.e., acceptance of the advice; β = .54, p < .001). In the final regression, 
                                                
15 We also examined this idea in Study 4.2 and obtained similar results.  
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the direct effect of decision-making procedure on acceptance of the advice dropped 
to nonsignificance after including trustworthiness of the CCS board as a covariate 
in the analysis (β = .22, p = .14). A Sobel test (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, 
West, & Sheets, 2002; Sobel, 1982) confirmed that te reduction of the direct 
effect was significant, z = 2.16, p < .04, indicating mediation. Thus, and consistent 
with Hypothesis 3, mediation analysis indicated that e effect of decision-making 
procedure on acceptance of the decision can be explained by the way the procedure 
affects inferences regarding the trustworthiness of the political decision maker (see 
Figure 4.1 for a schematic representation of the mediation model). 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Schematic representation of trust mediating the eff ct of decision-






The findings of Study 4.1 yield initial support for ur reasoning. We showed that 
people judge an authority as more trustworthy when it provides interest groups 
with an opportunity to voice their opinions in decision making (compared to not 
providing them with such opportunity). We also showed that people more readily 
accept the decision made by the authority in the case of a group-voice procedure 
relative to a no-voice procedure. Additional analyses upported the hypothesis that 
inferences of trustworthiness mediate the effect of decision-making procedure on 
acceptance of the decision. As such, Study 4.1 indicates that even when people are 
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not personally involved in decision making, the presence (versus absence) of group 
voice affects people’s reactions to decision-making authorities and the decisions 
that these authorities make. 
What remains unclear, however, is whether the effects of decision-making 
procedure on inferred trustworthiness and acceptance of the decision made were 
due to procedural features (i.e., the presence or absence of group voice) or due to 
the involvement of specific parties in the decision-making process. For example, 
these effects may have been caused by the mere fact that environmental NGOs 
either received or did not receive an opportunity to voice their opinion, regardless 
of whether industrial organizations received such an opportunity too. We examine 




The aim of Study 4.2 was threefold. The first goal w s to replicate the main finding 
of Study 4.1 that group voice in political decision making affects decision 
acceptance and that inferred trustworthiness mediates this relationship. A second 
goal was to examine whether inferred trustworthiness depends on whether or not 
voice is given (even if just to one interest group) or whether inferred 
trustworthiness depends on the fairness of the decision-making procedure in that 
both interest groups are given equal voice. Finally, this study enabled us to 
examine an alternative explanation for the findings obtained in Study 4.1 by 
investigating the possibility that inferred trustworthiness of the decision maker 
depends on whether voice is given to a specific but trusted type of interest group 
(i.e., environmental NGOs).  
Previous research suggests that not the provision of voice per se, but that 
equal voice is crucial to instigate trust. That is, work by Van den Bos and Lind 
(2001) indicates that people are sensitive to the unfairness implicit in unequal 
treatment. In fact, sometimes participants rated procedural fairness to be less after 
unequal treatment (even if they personally received a fair procedure, but another 
participant did not) than after unfair but equal trea ment (when both received unfair 
treatment). When only one type of interest group receives the opportunity to voice 
opinions in decision making, parties are treated uneq ally; hence the procedure is 
likely to be perceived as unfair, which may prevent people from seeing decision 
makers as trustworthy. Thus, for the second study we predict that unequal-voice 
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procedures induce relatively low perceived trustworhiness of decision makers 
because of people’s sensitivity to unequal treatmen (Hypothesis 4).  
As indicated above, it may also be the case that trus worthiness is already 
established when decision makers provide voice to an interest group that the 
general public trusts and identifies with. Research has shown that, in the context of 
CCS, the general public tends to trust the environmental NGOs more than the 
industrial organizations (see Chapter 3 of this thesis). This raises the question 
whether people value voice for relatively trustworthy interest groups more highly 
than voice for relatively untrustworthy interest groups. In a similar vein, people 
may perceive environmental NGOs to be more likely to represent their own views 
or interests and, therefore, consider voice for these organizations to be more 
important as a proxy for their own input than voice for industrial organizations. 
Thus, voice for an interest group that is trusted an is seen as best representing 
one’s own views may instigate greater trustworthiness in the decision-making 
authority than voice for an interest group that is less trusted and/or is less likely to 
represent one’s own position. 
In line with the results of Study 4.1, we predict that characteristics of the 
decision-making procedure determine decision acceptance, and that inferred 
trustworthiness of decision makers mediates the relationship between the decision-
making procedure and acceptance of the decision (Hypothesis 3). Furthermore, we 
compare two unequal-voice procedures (voice for enviro mental NGOs but not for 
industrial organizations, or vice versa) with an equal-voice procedure (both interest 
groups received voice) in order to examine the possibility that additional concerns 
play a role (e.g., equal treatment, or voice for specific interest groups). We 
predicted that an equal-voice procedure would instigate more trust than an unequal-
voice procedure (Hypothesis 4a), although we cannot rule out beforehand that 
giving voice to trusted NGOs might lead to higher levels of inferred 




Participants and design 
Eighty undergraduate students from Leiden University (58 women and 22 men) 
participated in the study and were randomly allocated to one of the six conditions 
of the 3 (procedure: voice for environmental NGOs only vs. voice for industrial 




organizations) by 2 (advice regarding CCS implementation: pro vs. con) between-
subjects experimental design. Upon completion of the experiment they were each 
paid 3 euros for participating in the experiment.   
 
Procedure and dependent variables 
Upon arrival at the laboratory participants were subjected to nearly the same 
procedure as in Study 4.1. They read the introductory text after which the parties 
concerned with CCS (i.e., environmental NGOs and industrial organizations) and 
the CCS board were introduced. The only difference with Study 4.1 was that, 
depending on experimental condition, participants i Study 4.2 either read that only 
environmental NGOs or only industrial organizations had received voice, or they 
were informed that both environmental NGOs and industrial organizations had 
received an opportunity to voice opinions before th CCS board gave an advice to 
the national government regarding the implementation of CCS. Controls of the 
manipulation and dependent variables were identical to those of Study 4.1 




We conducted an ANOVA with procedure as independent variable and procedural 
fairness judgments (assessed prior to the manipulaton of the advice) as dependent 
variable to check whether the procedure manipulation had an effect on procedural 
fairness judgments, which appeared to be the case, F(2, 77) = 17.38, p < .001, η2 
=.31. Additional t-tests served to examine which means significantly differed from 
each other. The t-test comparing the two unequal-voice conditions was not 
significant, t(50) = 0.14, ns. Thus, which type of organization received voice and 
which type did not receive voice did not affect procedural fairness ratings. The t-
tests that compared the unequal-voice conditions with the equal-voice condition 
were significant in both cases, t(53) = 5.31, p < .001 for the NGOs-voice condition 
compared to the equal-voice condition, and t(51) = 5.47, p < .001 for the industry-
voice condition compared to the equal-voice condition. Thus, the two unequal-
voice procedures were considered equally fair (MNGOs voice = 3.02, SD = 1.48 and 
Mindustry voice = 2.96, SD = 1.46), but both were considered significantly less fair than 
the equal-voice procedure (M = 4.82, SD = 0.99). 
Moreover, we checked participants’ perceptions of the decision-making 
procedure and awareness of the nature of the advice with questions at the end of 
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the study. Participants in the equal-voice condition indicated that both NGOs and 
industrial organizations received an opportunity to voice, participants in the NGOs-
voice condition indicated that NGOs received voice and industrial organizations 
did not, and participants in the industry-voice condition indicated that industrial 
organizations received voice and NGOs did not. Furthermore, participants in the 
pro-advice condition indicated that the CCS board gave an advice for CCS 
implementation, whereas participants in the con-advice condition indicated that the 
board gave an advice against CCS implementation. Thus, participants perceived the 
experimental manipulations as intended.   
 
Trustworthiness 
Hypothesis 4a stated that inferences regarding the trustworthiness of the CCS 
board would be lower after it used unequal-voice procedures than after it used an 
equal-voice procedure. As in Study 4.1, inferred trustworthiness was assessed prior 
to the manipulation of the advice. We conducted an ANOVA with procedure as 
independent variable and inferred trustworthiness of the CCS board as dependent 
variable. This analysis revealed the predicted effect, F(2, 77) = 6.27, p < .01, η2 = 
.14. Additional t-tests indicated no difference between the two unequal-voice 
conditions, t(50) = 0.58, ns, but revealed significant differences between the 
NGOs-voice condition on the one hand and the equal-voice condition on the other, 
t(53) = 2.83, p < .001, as well as between the industry-voice condition and the 
equal-voice condition, t(51) = 3.58, p < .001. Inspection of the relevant means 
revealed that participants in the unequal-voice conditions reported to have less trust 
in the board (MNGOs voice = 3.72, SD = 1.29 and Mindustry voice = 3.52, SD = 1.24) than 
participants in the equal-voice condition (M = 4.55, SD = 0.85). These results 
indicate that unequal-voice procedures instigate less trust (regardless of the type of 
organization that received voice) than equal-voice procedures and, therefore, these 
results provide support for Hypothesis 4a. Importantly, at the same time these 
results rule out the possibility formulated in Hypothesis 4b that the higher level of 
trustworthiness in the group-voice condition relative to the no-voice condition 
obtained in Study 4.1 was caused by the fact that a specific type of organization 
(e.g., environmental NGOs) received voice in the decision-making process, 








We performed an ANOVA with procedure and advice (pro vs. con) as independent 
variables and acceptance of the advice of the CCS board as dependent variable, 
which revealed a significant effect of procedure, F(2, 74) = 6.65, p < .01, η2 = .15, 
as well as a significant effect of advice, F(1, 74) = 7.14, p < .01, η2 = .09. 
Importantly, we did not observe an interaction, indicating that the effect of the 
procedure did not depend on the content of the advice that was given. The effect of 
advice showed that participants in this study accepted an advice for CCS 
implementation (M = 5.23, SD = 0.98) more readily than an advice against CCS 
implementation (M = 4.56, SD = 0.98). More relevant to our predictions, however, 
is the effect of decision-making procedure. Additional t-tests indicated no 
difference between the two unequal-voice conditions, t(50) = 0.14, ns, but again 
indicated significant differences between the NGOs-voice condition and the equal-
voice condition, t(53) = 2.89, p < .001, as well as between the industry-voice 
condition and the equal-voice condition, t(51) = 3.27, p < .001. Participants 
accepted the decision made less easily when this resulted from unequal-voice 
procedures (MNGOs voice = 4.59, SD = 1.41 and Mindustry voice = 4.54, SD = 1.23) than 
when this resulted from an equal-voice procedure (M = 5.54, SD = 0.98). 
 
Mediation analysis 
Again, we followed the procedure specified by Baron and Kenny (1986) to test by 
means of regression analyses whether inferred trustworthiness of the CCS board 
mediated the effect of procedure on acceptance of the advice (Hypothesis 3). First, 
however, we collapsed the two unequal-voice conditions in order to create a 
dichotomous independent variable (i.e., equal versus unequal group voice), as the 
two unequal-voice conditions did not differ from each other in terms of inferred 
trustworthiness or acceptance. This procedure allowed us to assess by means of a 
Sobel test whether the magnitude of the direct effect was significantly reduced after 
introduction of the proposed mediator in the equation. The first regression analysis 
showed that the effect of the predictor variable (i. ., procedure) on the outcome 
variable (i.e., acceptance of the advice) was significant (β = .36, p = .001). The 
second regression analysis showed that the effect o the predictor variable (i.e., 
procedure) on the proposed mediator (i.e., trustworthiness of the CCS board) was 
significant too (β = .37, p < .001). The relationship between the proposed mediator 
(i.e., trustworthiness of the CCS board) and the outcome variable (i.e., acceptance 
of the advice) was also significant (β = .33, p < .01). The final requirement is a 
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significant reduction of the direct effect of the predictor variable on the outcome 
variable after introduction of the proposed mediator in the equation. Although the 
effect of decision-making procedure on acceptance of the advice remained 
significant after including trustworthiness of the CCS board as a covariate in the 
analysis (β = .28, p < .05), the reduction of the direct effect was signif cant, Sobel z 
= 2.31, p = .02, indicating mediation. Thus, we replicated and extended the 
findings obtained in Study 4.1, namely that fair decision making (rather than the 
involvement of a specific type of interest group, or the provision of voice to some 
but not all parties involved) enhances trust in authori ies, and in this way fosters the 
acceptance of decisions made by this authority (seeFigure 4.2 for a schematic 
representation of the mediation model). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Schematic representation of trust mediating the eff ct of decision-






Study 4.1 and Study 4.2 indicate that when relevant interest groups receive voice in 
political decision making, this procedure enhances th  perceived trustworthiness of 
the decision-maker. Trustworthiness of the decision maker in turn makes people 
more willing to accept the decisions made. Critically, Study 4.2 also showed that 
an authority did not instigate much trust when it provided only NGOs or only 
industrial organizations with an opportunity to voice their opinion in the decision-
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making process. This finding rules out the possible alt rnative explanation for the 
results of Study 4.1 that trustworthiness is already established when decision 
makers provide voice to specific interest groups, for instance because these are 
seen as most likely to represent one’s own views. That is, Study 4.2 demonstrated 
that equality of treatment for different interest groups raises trustworthiness of 
decision makers and increases acceptance of decisions, ndependently of the 
identity of the parties involved in the decision-making process. Therefore, the 
results of Study 4.2 support the validity of our theoretical analysis and increase our 
confidence that people’s responses to the decision-making procedure and outcome 
depend on features of the decision-making process (rather than the features of the 




In Study 4.1 and Study 4.2, we have examined how people react to voice for 
specific parties in decision making about CCS impleentation. An important 
aspect of these studies was that people were informed about CCS prior to learning 
about the decision-making procedure and completing the questionnaires that we 
used to assess inferred trustworthiness of decision makers and acceptance of 
decisions made. As such, people possessed a reasonable amount of knowledge 
about CCS. Some individuals are likely to be better informed than others about a 
specific policy issue, however. In Study 4.3, we threfore examined whether well-
informed individuals compared to uninformed individuals respond differently to 
decision-making procedures. Specifically, we examined whether consulting 
members of the general public in decision making has effects on perceived 
trustworthiness of decision makers and decision acceptance similar to the effects 
obtained in the previous two studies. 
Previous research on self-esteem and reactions to voice (Brockner et al., 
1998) gives an indication of how knowledge on the topic may affect reactions to 
voice. According to Brockner and colleagues (1998), one determinant of people’s 
motivation to express opinions in decision-making processes is whether they 
consider their input to be meaningful. People who are not able to provide 
meaningful input, for instance because they lack the necessary knowledge to be 
able to do so, will be less motivated to voice their opinion than those who feel that 
they have the knowledge to provide meaningful input. Consequentially, people 
who lack the knowledge to provide meaningful input will be less affected by 
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whether or not they receive an opportunity to voice than people who have 
knowledge to do so. The research by Brockner and colleagues (1998), however, 
addressed individuals’ own opportunities to voice and concerned their direct 
personal involvement in a decision-making process. 
We extend this reasoning to decision-making processes in which 
individuals do not have personal involvement. When individuals are not personally 
involved in decision making, they have to judge whether the input of other parties 
can contribute to the quality of decision making, instead of considering whether or 
not their own input is likely to be meaningful. In this case, people who have a 
reasonable amount of knowledge of the issue may be more acutely aware of the 
different concerns and interests that are relevant and need to be taken into account. 
By contrast, these complexities are likely to be less salient for those with little 
knowledge of the issue, who then should attach less importance to whether or not 
different parties are involved in the decision-making procedure. Thus, extending 
the reasoning proposed by Brockner and colleagues (1998) on personal voice to 
predict the effects of group voice, we argue that individuals with some knowledge 
of the issue at hand care more about group voice than individuals who lack such 
knowledge. 
We manipulated participants’ knowledge level about CCS by means of 
providing versus not providing them with information about CCS, instead of 
measuring preexisting interpersonal differences in k owledge about CCS. 
Manipulating knowledge in this way reduces the likelihood of a possible confound 
of knowledge level with other variables such as care fo  the environment. Thus, to 
test our predictions we crossed the nature of the decision-making procedure 
(whether or not members of the public received voice in the decision-making 
process) with the amount of information about CCS provided (whether or not 
participants received additional information about CCS). We hypothesize that 
informed individuals care more about public voice in decision making than 
uninformed individuals (Hypothesis 5), and that variations in procedures elicit 
stronger effects on inferred trustworthiness and decision acceptance among 
informed individuals than among uninformed individuals (Hypothesis 6). 
Furthermore, we examine this different type of group voice to obtain additional 
support for our central prediction that the provision of group voice enhances 
inferred trustworthiness, which in turn mediates the effect of public voice (but not 






Participants and design 
Eighty-three undergraduate students from Leiden Univers ty participated in the 
study (51 women and 32 men). We randomly allocated each participant to one of 
the four conditions of the 2 (information about CCS: yes vs. no) by 2 (procedure: 
public voice vs. no public voice) factorial design. Upon completion of the 
experiment participants were each paid 3 euros for participating in the experiment. 
 
Procedure 
Upon arrival at the laboratory participants were led into separate cubicles, each 
containing a personal computer. On the computer scren the participants read that a 
new technology had been developed that enables the storage of carbon dioxide into 
underground sites. Participants further read that te decision whether or not this 
new technology, called CCS, should be implemented is both important and 
complex. Moreover, they read that the national governm nt had appointed a “CCS 
board” to advise the government about whether or not CCS should be 
implemented.  
After the introduction, participants in the information condition read “Later 
on you will be asked some questions, but first we want you to read a text that 
contains further information about CCS.” after which they read the text. This text 
was similar to the text that participants in Studies 4.1 and 4.2 had read and 
informed them about energy production, greenhouse gasses and global warming, 
and the new CCS technology. Participants in the no-information condition read 
“Later on you will be asked some questions, but first we want you to read a text 
that is not directly related to CCS, but that contains information about the Dutch 
climate.” after which they read this text. This text was not directly relevant to the 
decision that had to be made about CCS implementatio , but was comparable with 
the text about CCS in the information condition with regard to length and 
difficulty. After reading the text, all participants completed a test assessing their 
knowledge about CCS. Subsequently, participants completed a short questionnaire 
that assessed their desire for public voice in the decision-making process regarding 
CCS implementation. 
Upon completion of the questionnaire, participants read about the CCS 
board assigned to advise the national government about the implementation of CCS 
technology. They read that the CCS board had asked Leiden University to study 
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opinions regarding CCS and to write a report about these opinions. Participants in 
the public-voice condition read: 
 
The CCS board provides environmental NGOs, industrial 
organizations and representatives of the Dutch population an 
opportunity to voice their opinion. The CCS board has asked 
Leiden University to assess and report on the opinins of 
environmental NGOs, industrial organizations and, by means of 
sampling, a representation of the Dutch population. The report will 
be used in the formation of an advice concerning the 
implementation of CCS. You, however, are not included in the 
sample of people that receive an opportunity to voice. 
 
Participants in the public-no-voice condition read: 
  
The CCS board provides environmental NGOs and industrial 
organizations an opportunity to voice their opinion. The CCS 
board has asked Leiden University to assess and report on the 
opinions of environmental NGOs and industrial organiz tions. The 
report will be used in the formation of an advice con erning the 
implementation of CCS. The CCS board does not provide the 
Dutch population an opportunity to voice their opinions, so these 
will not be represented in the report. 
 
The experiment continued with a second questionnaire that contained 
measures of participant’s willingness to accept the advice and that assessed their 
inferences regarding the trustworthiness of the CCS board. Subsequently, 
participants answered to the control question regarding the manipulation of 
procedure. Finally, they were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their participation in 
the study. 
 
Dependent variables  
Manipulation checks. We checked for the success of the information manipulation 
using the score on the knowledge test (which was directly administered after the 
information manipulation). The test contained five multiple-choice questions, each 




incorrect answer “0” and added the scores on the five questions to create an overall 
“knowledge score”. We checked for the success of the procedure manipulation by 
asking participants near the end of the experiment “Does the CCS board provide 
Dutch citizens an opportunity to voice their opinion about CCS technology?” (1 = 
Yes, all Dutch citizens receive an opportunity to voice th ir opinion, 2 = Some 
Dutch citizens receive an opportunity to voice their opinion and some do not, 3 = 
No, Dutch citizens do not receive an opportunity to voice their opinion). 
Desire for public voice. The measure of participants’ desire for an 
opportunity for the public to voice opinions contaied three items (α = .77), “To 
what extent do you consider an opportunity for the Dutch population to voice 
opinions about implementation of CCS to be desirable?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much), “To what extent do you consider an opportunity to voice an opinion about 
CCS to be important?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much), and “The Dutch population 
should have the right to vote about the implementation of CCS.” (1 = completely 
disagree, 7 = completely agree). 
Acceptance. We measured acceptance of the advice using the item “To 
what extent are you willing to accept the advice by the CCS board?” (1 = not at all, 
7 = very much).  
Trustworthiness. We assessed inferred trustworthiness of the CCS board 




We conducted an ANOVA with information about CCS (yes vs. no) as 
independent variable and the knowledge score on the test as dependent variable, 
which showed the expected difference in the amount f knowledge that participants 
had about CCS, F(1, 81) = 215.36, p < .001, η2 = .73. Participants who had read the 
text about CCS technology had significantly more knowledge about CCS 
technology (M = 4.56, SD = 0.67) than those who had not read this text (M = 1.60, 
SD = 1.13). Analysis of responses on the question checking the procedure 
manipulation showed that all participants answered this question as intended. All 
participants in the public-no-voice condition answered that the public did not 
receive an opportunity to voice their opinion about CCS technology (answer no. 3), 
whereas all participants in the public-voice condition answered that some members 
of the Dutch population received an opportunity to voice their opinion and some 
did not (answer no. 2). 
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Desire for public voice 
We conducted an ANOVA with information about CCS (yes vs. no) as 
independent variable and desire for an opportunity for the general public to voice 
opinions as dependent variable. This analysis showed a significant effect, F(1, 81) 
= 4.75, p < .04, η2 = .06. In line with our reasoning underlying Hypothesis 5, 
informed participants reported a greater desire for public voice (M = 4.11, SD = 
1.63) than uninformed participants (M = 3.42, SD = 1.21).  
 
Acceptance 
We performed an ANOVA with information about CCS and the procedure used by 
the CCS board (public voice vs. no public voice) as independent variables and 
willingness to accept the advice of the CCS board as dependent variable. This 
analysis revealed a main effect for procedure, F(1, 79) = 7.02, p < .01, η2 = .08, 
which was qualified by a significant Procedure by Information interaction, F(1, 79) 
= 5.73, p < .02, η2 = .07. In line with our reasoning and as predicted in Hypothesis 
6, additional analyses of simple main effects revealed that the type of decision-
making procedure affected participants’ willingness to accept the advice if they had 
received information about CCS, F(1, 80) = 13.39, p < .001, but did not affect 
uninformed participants’ willingness to accept the advice, F(1, 80) = 0.03, ns. 
Informed participants were more willing to accept the advice after a public-voice 
procedure than a public-no-voice procedure, whereas uninformed participants’ 
willingness to accept the advice did not depend on the type of decision-making 
procedure (for means and standard deviations, see Tabl  4.1). 
 
Trustworthiness 
We performed an ANOVA with information and procedure as independent 
variables and trustworthiness of the CCS board as dependent variable. This 
analysis showed a main effect of procedure, F(1, 79) = 7.15, p < .01, η2 = .08, 
which was qualified by a significant Procedure by Information interaction, F(1, 79) 
= 4.49, p < .04, η2 = .05. In support of Hypothesis 6, the type of procedure affected 
trust in the CCS board among participants who had been informed about CCS, but 
did not affect the level of trust among uninformed participants. Informed 
participants judged the CCS board to be more trustworthy when it employed a 
public-voice procedure than when it employed a public-no-voice procedure, 
whereas uninformed participants were inclined to trust the decision-making 




see Table 4.1). These results support our prediction that participants with a 
reasonable level of knowledge about CCS respond more p sitively to public-voice 
procedures than to public-no-voice procedures, even if they are not personally 
involved in decision making.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Means (and SD) for decision acceptance and inferred t ustworthiness as 


















































Again, we performed mediation analysis to examine whether inferred 
trustworthiness of the CCS board mediated the relationship between procedure and 
acceptance. However, we hypothesized this indirect effect to be moderated by 
participants’ knowledge level. That is, we predicted hat public voice would only 
affect acceptance of the advice through inferred trustworthiness (the proposed 
mediator) among informed participants, not among uninformed participants. Baron 
and Kenny’s (1986) procedure to test for mediation provided initial support for this 
prediction. By showing the significant Information by Procedure interaction on the 
outcome variable (i.e., acceptance; β = -.43, p < .02) and the proposed mediator 
(i.e., trust; β = -.38, p < .04) we met the first two requirements for mediation. The 
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required association between the proposed mediator and the outcome variable was 
also significant, β = .53, p < .001. Moreover, we found that the Information by 
Procedure interaction on the outcome variable dropped to nonsignificance (β = -
.26, p = .12) after introduction of the proposed mediator in the equation. The 
reduction of the magnitude of the interaction effect was significant, Sobel z = 1.98, 
p < .05 (see Figure 4.3), indicating mediation. In addition to this analysis, we 
applied the procedure developed by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007) to test for 
moderated mediation, which uses bootstrapping to test for mediation at different 
levels of the moderator variable. This analysis further corroborated our reasoning 
because it supported the mediation model among informed participants (boot z = 
2.75, p < .01), but not among uninformed participants (boot z = 0.36, p > .70). 
Thus, consistent with Study 4.1 and Study 4.2, these mediation analyses provided 
support for the mediating role of trustworthiness in the relationship between 
decision-making procedure and acceptance of the advice. 
 
Discussion 
This study offers converging support for our central prediction that characteristics 
of a decision-making procedure affect people’s trust in the decision-making 
authority, which in turn determines the likelihood that they will accept decisions 
made by this authority. Study 4.3 further indicates hat knowledge about CCS 
technology can moderate this effect: Informed peopl reacted more positively to 
public voice compared to no public voice, while uninformed people seemed 
relatively indifferent about an opportunity for members of the general public to 
voice their opinions. This finding extends existing i sights on procedural voice as 
it suggests that people do not automatically display negative reactions to no-voice 
procedures. Instead, we showed that responses also depend on people’s knowledge 
of the problem, which determines the extent to which they find it desirable for the 




In the current research we have focused on how acceptance of policy decisions is 
affected by whether or not interest groups receive an opportunity to voice their 
opinion in decision making. The decision-making issue concerned the 
implementation of carbon dioxide storage as a climate mitigation option, which is 




Figure 4.3 Schematic representation of trust mediating the eff ct of decision-





voice for interest groups in decision-making processes, which we refer to as group 
voice, affects inferred trustworthiness of decision makers and, as a result, impacts 
on acceptance of the decisions made. That is, the curr nt studies show that people 
use procedural information to determine whether or not an authority is worthy of 
trust and more readily accept decisions made by trustworthy decision makers. 
Study 4.3 indicates that one’s knowledge level can moderate this effect: Informed 
people reacted more positively to public-voice procedures compared to public-no-
voice procedures, whereas uninformed people seemed relatively indifferent about 
an opportunity for members of the general public to voice their opinions.  
Our experiments contribute to the existing literatue in several ways. First 
and foremost, the experiments presented in the current chapter show that 
procedural voice is not only important in the case of personal involvement in 
decision making. In our studies, group-voice effects occurred even though 
participants were not personally involved in the decision-making process. In this 
way, the present work extends previous research in the domain of procedural 
fairness, which has primarily focused on personal voice in decision making. We 
argue that the difference between personal and group v ice is important because 
traditional self-oriented explanations (e.g., instrumental and relational accounts) for 
preferences of voice procedures over no-voice procedures do not easily apply in the 
case of group voice. Whereas self-relevant implications are proposed to account for 
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the effects of voice at the personal level, implications of the procedure for the 
decision maker (i.e., inferred trustworthiness) canexplain why people value group-
voice procedures over no-voice procedures. 
Another important contribution of the present research is our assessment of 
reactions to decision-making processes in which several parties with different 
identities are involved. In Study 4.1 and Study 4.2, we specifically focused on 
whether people care about voice for interest groups other than the general public 
(i.e., environmental NGOs and industrial organizations). Study 4.3 extended this 
analysis by focusing on reactions to procedures that explicitly do or do not provide 
the general public (but not the individual in question) with an opportunity to voice 
opinions. Across all three studies, we found that te provision of group voice by a 
decision-making authority – communicating a fair procedure – instigated trust, 
which resulted in a greater willingness to accept decisions made by the decision 
maker. Importantly, we excluded alternative explanatio s, such as the possibility 
that the involvement of specific parties is crucial (Study 4.2). Thus, it seems 
important that different types of interest groups have equal opportunities to voice 
their opinions in decision making, independently ofthe identity of the 
organizations involved.  
The current research also contributes to the existing literature in that we 
examined the effects of the level of information available to the self (Study 4.3). 
Interestingly, this last study showed that reactions to public-voice procedures only 
differed from reactions to public-no-voice procedures among people who had 
received information about CCS, but not among those who had not received such 
information. That is, we found that only people who had some knowledge of the 
topic under consideration displayed public-voice effects. One explanation for this 
finding is that participants who had been informed about CCS were more aware of 
the complexity of the issue and the need for proper decision-making procedures in 
dealing with this issue. The topic was still quite complex for informed participants, 
so that they did not have particularly strong feelings about the accuracy or 
favorability of the decision-making outcome (recall that in Study 4.1 and 4.2 
participants’ own attitudes towards CCS implementation did not affect acceptance 
of the advice provided by the CCS board, regardless of the nature of this advice). 
Nevertheless, they did consider it important that attention is paid to the concerns 
among the general public with regard to CCS. Thus, as a result of the information 
received they see the importance of integrating views and concerns of different 




The positive relationship between trustworthiness of decision makers and 
acceptance of policy decisions observed in the current esearch complements 
findings in other areas of research indicating thatrustworthiness of authorities has 
positive effects on their effective functioning (Tyler & Degoey, 1996). For 
example, it has been found that employees’ trust in upervisors positively impacts 
employees’ support for their supervisor, particularly when outcomes are 
unfavorable (Brockner, Siegel, Daly, Tyler, & Martin, 1997). Moreover, 
trustworthiness of organizational authorities has been found to positively influence 
subordinates’ organizational citizenship behavior (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994), job 
performance (Oldham, 1975), and other types of constructive organizational 
behavior (for an overview, see Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). At the societal level, 
trustworthiness of legal authorities creates citizen compliance to rules without 
coercion (Tyler, 1990). Along these lines, we have shown here that trustworthiness 
of the parties responsible for making national-leve policy decisions positively 
affects public acceptance of these decisions, which is necessary for successful 
implementation of the policies in question. 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
The current results were obtained in experiments among undergraduate university 
students, which may be raised as a possible limitation. We think, however, that the 
use of these participants does not necessarily undermin  the validity of our current 
findings. In fact, it can be argued that student populations provide a strong test for 
our prediction that the provision of voice to interest groups (without any personal 
involvement in the decision-making process) can enhance trust in decision-making 
authorities and foster decision acceptance. That is, undergraduate students are 
likely to have higher intelligence, to be more politically active, and to have greater 
knowledge about scientific constructs, probably causing them to be more critical of 
authorities than a representative sample of members of the general public. 
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that undergraduate students differ from 
other people in how important they consider fair procedures to be or in the extent 
to which they think trustworthiness is important. Fairness and trustworthiness 
represent quite basic human values that do not only apply to this context or to the 
undergraduate students in these experiments. Indeed, a positive correlation between 
trust in organizations using gene technology and public acceptance of this 
technology was obtained from a representative sample of the Swiss population 
(Siegrist, 2000). Similarly, Leung and colleagues (2007) showed that Hong Kong 
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citizens’ evaluations of the Hong Kong government were influenced by the fairness 
of the procedures used to arrive at policy decisions regarding Vietnamese asylum 
seekers. This illustrates the robustness of voice effects in general, and suggests that 
the observations of the present research may generalize to broader research 
populations.   
Finally, even though undergraduate students may possess more knowledge 
about scientific constructs in general, just like mmbers of the general public they 
will tend to have relatively little knowledge about a specific issue such as CCS. 
Indeed, in Study 4.3 participants who did not receive specific information about 
CCS technology were clearly less able to correctly answer a number of questions 
testing their knowledge of the issue at hand than those who had received such 
information. Comparable differences in knowledge leve  are likely to be observed 
among members of the general public, of whom some will have or develop a 
reasonable level of knowledge about CCS, whereas others will stay uninformed. 
For the same reason, we think that the results of the current studies are not limited 
to the decision-making issue under consideration here (i.e., CCS implementation), 
but should also be found in research on other natiol-level policymaking 
situations. Future research could examine the boundary conditions of the effects 
observed here, for example by assessing group-voice effects in decision making on 
issues that are less difficult to judge for members of the general public or about 
which people have stronger outcome preference. Potentially, in these cases 
people’s own outcome preferences impact on authority evaluations and acceptance 
of policy decisions, over and above the element of gr up voice in decision making. 
Future research is needed to examine this possibility. 
 
Conclusion 
On the basis of three studies we conclude that inferred trustworthiness of decision 
makers is an important attribute in complex political decision making. When 
people are not capable of determining whether a certain decision is favorable or 
unfavorable, they will more readily accept the decision and display support 
behavior when the decision maker is considered to be trustworthy (rather than 
untrustworthy). Furthermore, we have shown that people use procedural 
information about group voice to determine whether or not they can trust the 
authority. Accordingly, policymakers should be aware that acceptance of policy 
decisions is not only affected by the content of the information that they provide to 




reach policy decisions and that they communicate the nature of these decision-
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(Summary in Dutch) 
 
eze dissertatie gaat over antecedenten en consequenties van publiek 
vertrouwen in organisaties die betrokken zijn bij de ontwikkeling van en 
de besluitvorming over CCS16 technologie. In het kort houdt deze 
technologie in dat het koolstofdioxide (CO2) dat vrijkomt bij de verbranding van 
fossiele brandstoffen wordt afgevangen en getransporteerd naar geologische 
formaties (bijvoorbeeld lege aardgasvelden) waarin het langdurig kan worden 
opgeslagen. Het doel van CCS technologie is het verminderen van de alsmaar 
toenemende concentratie koolstofdioxide in de atmosfeer, aangezien dit volgens 
wetenschappers de voornaamste oorzaak van klimaatver ndering is (IPCC, 2007). 
Door middel van de inzet van CCS technologie kan energiewinning uit fossiele 
brandstoffen blijven plaatsvinden zonder dat de concentratie koolstofdioxide in de 
atmosfeer toeneemt. Vanwege deze eigenschap wordt de inzet van CCS 
technologie, naast het terugdringen van energieverbruik en het uitvoeriger benutten 
van duurzame energiebronnen, beschouwd als een belagrijke strategie om de 
uitstoot van koolstofdioxide te verminderen en daarmee klimaatverandering tegen 
te gaan. 
Publieke acceptatie van CCS is cruciaal voor het succesvol implementeren 
van deze technologie. Onderzoek heeft echter aangetoond dat mensen weinig 
kennis hebben over CCS en de relatie tussen de concentratie koolstofdioxide in de 
atmosfeer en het veranderende klimaat (de Best-Waldhober, Daamen, & Faaij, in 
druk). Hierdoor zijn zij niet goed in staat om zelf tot een weloverwogen en accuraat 
oordeel over de wenselijkheid van de technologie te komen (dit principe geldt ook 
voor andere complexe technologieën, zoals gentechnologie; Siegrist, 2000). 
Daarom is de vraag op grond waarvan mensen zullen besluiten de inzet van CCS te 
accepteren of juist af te wijzen. 
De redenering die in deze dissertatie centraal staat is dat mensen zich 
hierbij zullen laten leiden door de mate van vertrouwen die zij hebben in de 
organisaties die betrokken zijn bij CCS (onder anderen industriële organisaties, 
milieuorganisaties en overheidsorganisaties). Naarmte en meer vertrouwen heeft 
in een organisatie zal men eerder geneigd zijn het standpunt met betrekking tot de 
                                                
16 De afkorting “CCS” staat in het Engels voor “carbon dioxide capture and storage”. 
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inzet van CCS technologie van deze organisatie te volgen. Het doel van deze 
dissertatie is inzicht te verschaffen in factoren die van invloed zijn op de mate van 
publiek vertrouwen in CCS organisaties en te toetsen hoe publiek vertrouwen van 
invloed is op publieke acceptatie van CCS. 
In Hoofdstuk 1 wordt een korte inleiding gegeven opde huidige 
klimaatproblematiek en de rol die CCS technologie kan spelen bij het tegengaan 
van klimaatverandering. Daarna volgt een korte bespreking van relevante literatuur 
over vertrouwen en wordt een drietal psychologische processen beschreven die 
relevant zijn voor een beter begrip van antecedenten en consequenties van publiek 
vertouwen in organisaties die betrokken zijn bij CCS. Het eerste proces heeft 
betrekking op de relatie tussen publiek vertrouwen op basis van competenties en 
publiek vertrouwen op basis van integriteit aan de ene kant en publieke acceptatie 
van CCS aan de andere kant. Het tweede proces betreft de invloed van door CCS 
organisaties naar het publiek gecommuniceerde informatie op de mate van publiek 
vertrouwen in deze organisaties. Het derde proces gaat over de relatie tussen de 
wijze waarop besluiten ten aanzien van CCS tot stand komen, het vertrouwen dat 
mensen in de besluitvormer hebben, en de mate waarin zij geneigd zijn besluiten 
van deze besluitvormer te accepteren. Het onderzoek dat naar deze drie processen 
is gedaan staat beschreven in de drie empirische hoofdstukken die deel uitmaken 
van deze dissertatie (Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4).  
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen twee typen vertrouwen. 
Het eerste type heeft betrekking op vertrouwen dat gebaseerd is op percepties van 
de competentie van een organisatie en is gerelateerd aan vragen als “Heeft de 
organisatie veel ervaring op dit gebied?”en “Heeft de organisatie voldoende 
expertise in huis?”. Het tweede type vertrouwen is gebaseerd op percepties van de 
integriteit van een organisatie en is gerelateerd aan vragen als “Geeft de organisatie 
eerlijke informatie?” en “Heeft de organisatie oog voor publieke belangen of 
slechts voor eigenbelang?”. Door middel van experimnteel onderzoek is 
vervolgens de invloed van deze twee typen vertrouwen op publieke acceptatie van 
CCS in kaart gebracht hoe. Uit het onderzoek blijkt da  mensen geneigd zijn de 
positie van een CCS organisatie te volgen wanneer zij op basis van waarnemingen 
ten aanzien van de competentie van de organisatie veel vertrouwen in de 
organisatie hebben. Dat wil zeggen dat mensen in dit geval meer geneigd zijn de 
inzet van CCS te accepteren wanneer de organisatie een voorstander is van CCS 
dan wanneer de organisatie een tegenstander is van CCS. Dit effect lijkt te worden 
veroorzaakt door het feit dat mensen de voordelen van CCS groter achten wanneer 
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de organisatie een voorstander is dan wanneer de organisatie een tegenstander is. 
Echter, als het op competentie gebaseerde vertrouwen laag is, dan laten mensen 
zich niet zozeer beïnvloeden door het standpunt van de organisatie. In dit geval 
lijkt het er op dat mensen twijfelen over de juistheid van het oordeel van de 
organisatie, waardoor het standpunt van de organisatie niet van invloed is op hoe 
mensen de voordelen van CCS beoordelen (en op hun bereidheid om CCS te 
accepteren).  
De invloed van op integriteit gebaseerd vertrouwen in een organisatie op 
acceptatie van CCS is anders dan de hierboven beschreven invloed van op 
competentie gebaseerd vertrouwen. Als vertrouwen in ee  organisatie laag is 
vanwege waarnemingen met betrekking tot de integritit van de organisatie, dan 
zijn mensen geneigd tegen de positie van deze organisatie in te gaan. In dit geval 
verwerpen mensen de inzet van CCS als de organisatie een voorstander is van de 
inzet van CCS, terwijl zij geneigd zijn CCS te accepteren wanneer de organisatie 
een tegenstander is. Echter, als vertrouwen in een organisatie hoog is vanwege 
waarnemingen ten aanzien van de integriteit van de organisatie, dan lijkt het 
standpunt van de organisatie niet zozeer van invloed op acceptatie van CCS. Dit 
onderzoek is relevant omdat het laat zien dat het voor organisaties die als weinig 
integer worden waargenomen van groot belang is om in te zetten op manieren 
waarmee het waargenomen gebrek aan integriteit overk men kan worden. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt onderzocht hoe publiek vertrouwen in verschillende 
typen CCS organisaties afhangt van de motieven die mensen deze organisaties 
toedichten. Hierin wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen twee typen motieven, 
namelijk publiekdienende motieven (zoals zorg voor het milieu en publiek welzijn) 
en organisatiedienende motieven (zoals het nastreven van een zo groot mogelijke 
winst en het verkrijgen van een positief imago). Een veldstudie laat zien dat 
mensen meer vertrouwen hebben in milieuorganisaties dan in industriële 
organisaties die bij CCS betrokken zijn. Dit verschil in publiek vertrouwen kan 
worden verklaard door het feit dat mensen denken dat milieuorganisaties het 
publieke belang nastreven (publiekdienende motieven), terwijl zij denken dat 
industriële organisaties het belang van de organisatie zelf nastreven 
(organisatiedienende motieven). Het verschil in publiek vertrouwen kan niet 
verklaard worden door eventuele verschillen in competentie aangezien zowel 
milieuorganisaties als industriële organisaties relati f competent gevonden worden.  
In dit hoofdstuk wordt ook experimenteel onderzocht hoe communicatie 
over motieven van invloed is op de mate van vertrouwen in deze typen 
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organisaties. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat organisaties het meest worden vertrouwd 
wanneer zij argumenten met betrekking tot de inzet van CCS geven die in 
overeenstemming zijn met het type motief dat mensen va  de organisaties 
verwachten (bijvoorbeeld een economisch argument voor de inzet van CCS door 
een industriële organisatie). Dit impliceert dat industriële organisaties weinig 
vertrouwen wekken door publiekdienende motieven te communiceren en beter 
“eerlijk” uit kunnen komen voor de organisatiedienend  motieven die hen worden 
toegedicht. Gelijktijdig communiceren van publiekdienende motieven 
(bijvoorbeeld een milieuargument voor de inzet van CCS) en organisatiedienende 
motieven lijkt een effectievere manier voor industriële organisaties om vertrouwen 
te wekken onder het publiek. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt aandacht besteed aan de invloed van het 
besluitvormingsproces ten aanzien van CCS op de matvan publiek vertrouwen in 
de besluitvormer en acceptatie van besluiten die worden genomen. Specifiek wordt 
onderzocht hoe het geven van inspraak aan verschillende typen belanghebbenden 
(i.e., milieuorganisaties, industriële organisaties en de Nederlandse bevolking) van 
invloed is op de mate van publiek vertrouwen in de politieke besluitvormer, 
aangezien dit medebepalend zal zijn voor de mate waarin het publiek geneigd is het 
voorgestelde beleid ten aanzien van CCS te accepteren. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat 
het expliciet geven van inspraak aan milieuorganisatie  en industriële organisaties 
in het CCS besluitvormingsproces meer vertrouwen wekt en daardoor inderdaad tot 
meer acceptatie van besluiten over de inzet van CCS leidt dan wanneer geen 
mogelijkheid tot inspraak aan deze organisaties wordt gegeven. Dit effect van 
“groepsinspraak” op de mate van vertrouwen in de besluitvormer en acceptatie van 
het besluit kan niet worden verklaard door het simpele feit dat milieuorganisaties 
inspraak kregen (ongeacht of industriële organisatie  ook inspraak in de 
besluitvorming kregen). Vervolgonderzoek laat namelijk zien dat besluitvormers 
vertrouwen wekken als zij inspraak geven aan beide typ n organisaties, maar niet 
als zij alleen inspraak geven aan een specifiek type organisatie en niet aan een 
ander type organisatie. Kortom, het is niet zo dat mensen het enkel belangrijk 
vinden dat milieuorganisaties die zij vertrouwen inspraak krijgen; mensen vinden 
het belangrijk dat besluiten op een grondige en rechtvaardige manier tot stand 
komen en daarbij is ook het geven van inspraak aan industriële organisaties van 
belang.  
Het laatste onderzoek in dit hoofdstuk heeft betrekking op het wel of niet 
geven van inspraak aan de Nederlandse bevolking en de vraag of het kennisniveau 
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van mensen ten aanzien van CCS van invloed is op hoe belangrijk zij publieke 
inspraak vinden. Het in kaart brengen van de invloed van kennisniveau op hoe 
mensen reageren op karakteristieken van CCS besluitvormingsprocedures is 
ondermeer van belang omdat er in de toekomst ook kennisverschillen onder de 
Nederlandse bevolking zullen zijn. In dit onderzoek werd daarom de helft van de 
deelnemers geïnformeerd over CCS en de ander helft ni t, waardoor een groep 
ontstond met relatief veel kennis over CCS technologie en een groep met relatief 
weinig kennis over dit onderwerp. Vervolgens werden  deelnemers geïnformeerd 
over het CCS besluitvormingsproces. De helft van alle deelnemers las dat naast 
milieuorganisaties en industriële organisaties ook het publiek inspraak kreeg, 
terwijl de andere deelnemers lazen dat alleen milieuorganisaties en industriële 
organisaties inspraak kregen en de bevolking niet. D  resultaten van dit onderzoek 
laten zien dat mensen die weinig kennis hebben over CCS publieke inspraak niet 
essentieel vinden; het feit dat zij weten dat zowel milieuorganisaties als industriële 
organisaties inspraak hebben lijkt voor hen genoeg. Voor mensen met een grotere 
mate van kennis over CCS lijken publieke inspraak in het besluitvormingsproces 
echter wel van belang. Zij zijn meer geneigd besluiten met betrekking tot de inzet 
van CCS te accepteren op basis van een besluitvormingsprocedure waarin ook het 
publiek inspraak heeft dan op basis van een procedure ie niet voorziet in een 
mogelijkheid voor inspraak van de Nederlandse bevolking.  
Het onderzoek in deze dissertatie heeft zowel belangrijke theoretische als 
praktische implicaties. Vanuit theoretisch oogpunt is het onderzoek relevant omdat 
het bijvoorbeeld laat zien dat de twee typen vertrouwen (vertrouwen op basis van 
competentie en vertrouwen op basis van integriteit) op verschillende manieren van 
invloed zijn op publieke acceptatie van een nieuwe technologie zoals CCS. Hoewel 
het onderzoek experimenteel van karakter is, heeft het zeker ook relevantie voor de 
praktijk. Sterker nog, experimenteel onderzoek is uitermate geschikt voor het 
vroegtijdig identificeren en analyseren van psychologische processen die een rol 
zullen gaan spelen bij het tot stand komen van toekomstige publieke acceptatie van 
de inzet van CCS, zonder daarbij de doelgroep (bijvoorbeeld de Nederlandse 
bevolking of omwonenden van een koolstofdioxide opslagveld) te “besmetten”. 
Immers, op deze manier is het bijvoorbeeld mogelijk eerst te onderzoeken welke 
wijze van communiceren effectief is zonder eerst een paar keer de mist in te gaan 
bij het informeren van mensen (wat zeer belangrijke gevolgen kan hebben voor de 
mate van publieke acceptatie van CCS). Besef van de processen die een rol spelen 
bij publieke acceptatie van CCS is cruciaal om te voorkomen dat mensen de inzet 
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van CCS om onjuiste redenen verwerpen (bijvoorbeeld wanneer zij zich baseren op 
ideeën die aantoonbaar niet kloppen). 
  
Conclusie 
Het huidige onderzoek heeft enkele processen blootgelegd die van belang zijn voor 
het voorspellen en verklaren van de mate van publieke acceptatie van CCS. Hieruit 
blijkt dat publieke acceptatie van CCS niet alleen zal afhangen van de objectieve 
kwaliteiten van CCS en de informatie die hierover wordt gegeven, maar ook in 
belangrijke mate van het type informatie dat wordt gegeven (bijvoorbeeld 
informatie met betrekking tot milieu- versus economische consequenties van CCS 
of informatie over potentiële voordelen versus risico’s van CCS), de bron die de 
informatie geeft (bijvoorbeeld milieuorganisaties versus industriële organisaties) en 
de wijze waarop besluiten met betrekking tot CCS tot s and komen. Ten eerste 
geeft het onderzoek aan dat het voor organisaties desastreus is wanneer het publiek 
hen waarneemt als niet integer. Aangezien publiek vrtrouwen in industriële 
organisaties te wensen over laat is het voornamelijk voor deze organisaties van 
belang om door middel van communicatie naar het publiek het vertrouwen van 
mensen te vergroten. Communicatie lijkt niet effectief wanneer industriële 
organisaties alleen publiekdienende (milieu)argumenten voor de inzet van CCS 
geven. Industriële organisaties doen er beter aan eerlijk naar het publiek te 
communiceren dat naast de gevolgen voor het milieu ook organisatiedienende 
motieven een rol spelen. Voor overheidsorganisaties is het van belang om duidelijk 
aan te geven dat er zowel milieuorganisaties als industriële organisaties bij de 
besluitvorming over CCS betrokken zijn. Hierdoor wordt de suggestie van 
achterkamertjespolitiek vermeden en wordt duidelijk dat besluiten op een 
rechtvaardige en goede manier tot stand komen. Dit wek vertrouwen en kan tevens 
al in een vroegtijdig stadium van de besluitvorming over CCS plaatsvinden. Het is 
in de toekomst aan de verschillende CCS organisaties om de inzichten die deze 
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